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INTRODUCTION
Conflicting visions of what the Endangered Species Act
(ESA)' is and what it should be abound. Is it a tenacious pit
bull of environmental law, unyielding in its demand for species
protection? Should it be? Or, is it a paper tiger, bending its
purported authority at the slightest hint of political or economic
pressure? Should it be?
In fact, the ESA is a little of both-something like a pit
bull on a firm leash. It has stopped a massive federal spending
project dead in its tracks to protect the endurance of a small
fish, 2 yet it has accommodated well-planned land development
around the nation with a measure of flexibility not
characteristic of many other environmental laws. 3 Indeed, I
daresay that the ESA, in its most shining moments, is
remarkably eco-pragmatic. And, I contend, it should be even
more so. This Article explains why.
In Eco-pragmatism,4 Professor Dan Farber lays out an
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000). This Article is not intended to provide
a comprehensive overview of the law, policy, and practice under the ESA. For
that background, see MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE ROWLAND, THE
EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 193-276 (3d ed. 1997); ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES (Donald C. Baur & William
Robert Irvin eds., 2002); STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC'Y, THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT (2001); TONY A. SULLINS, ESA: ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
(2001).
2. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1978). Despite
substantial equitable considerations, the Court refused to relieve the
Tennessee Valley Authority from its duty under the ESA not to allow its
construction and operation of a dam that would jeopardize the continued
existence of the endangered snail darter. Id. The Court observed that the
"plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt and reverse the
trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost," id. at 184, and that in this
regard the ESA "admits of no exception." Id. at 173. For thoughtful accounts
of the case, including its historical preludes and aftermath, see Oliver Houck,
Unfinished Stories, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 867, 921-42 (2002); Zygmunt J.B.
Plater, Environmental Law in the Political Ecosystem-Coping With the
Reality of Politics, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 423, 423-71 (2002). For further
description of the case and the "no jeopardy" mandate, see infra text
accompanying notes 108-29.
3. Specifically, the Habitat Conservation Plan program allows
development projects that might harm a species protected under the ESA to
proceed with the intended activity under conditions imposed through a plan
approved by the federal government. See J.B. Ruhl, How to Kill Endangered
Species, Legally: The Nuts and Bolts of EndangeredSpecies Act "HCP"Permits
for Real Estate Development, 5 ENVTL. LAW. 345, 376-96 (1999). For further
discussion of the Habitat Conservation Plan program, see infra text
accompanying notes 207-28.
4. DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM (1999).
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agenda for reshaping environmental policy dialogue around a
new amalgam of values and instruments, one free of the bipolar
extremism that has saddled the development of environmental
law and policy for decades. 5 He asks us to walk away from the
ongoing war between the "tree huggers" and the "bean
counters,"6 and to adopt in its place a process for resolving
environmental policy issues that depends fundamentally
on the
7
philosophy of pragmatism as its guiding light.
Farber found a convert in me, and I suspect in many
others. Long disenchanted with the ability of conventional
environmental policy warfare to tackle the compelling issues of
our future, such as climate change, invasive species, urban
sprawl, fisheries depletion, property rights, and watershed
management, I was a soul lost in the middle, a soul looking for
a religion to give my position in the middle meaning and
purpose. Eco-pragmatism inspired me to delve more deeply
into the philosophy of pragmatism and to consider its
applications in settings beyond the pollution control context
Farber used to explore its virtues as a foundation for
environmental policy. My background is steeped in the ESA
and similar natural resource assessment and protection laws
such as the National Environmental Protection Act and section
404 of the Clean Water Act. A bit like an apostle, then, I
attempted to spread the word of eco-pragmatism throughout
that segment of environmental policy. 8
Enough of the Biblical metaphors! My purpose here is to
refine eco-pragmatism in the particular setting of the ESA.
The ESA presents a particularly challenging case for ecopragmatism. As its name implies, the ESA deals with a tragic
set of circumstances-the possibility that humans have caused

5.

The development of environmental law and policy has been and

continues to be characterized by extremist politics. Rena I. Steinzor, "You
Just Don't Understand!"--The Right and Left in Conversation, 32 ENVTL. L.
REP. 11109, 11109 (2002) ("[Tlhe vie, -s of stakeholders are polarized, and

much time is spent engaging in damaging guerilla attacks on the other side.").
6. FARBER, supra note 4, at 35-69 (describing the two camps). See
generally Christopher H. Schroeder, Prophets, Priests, and Pragmatists, 87

MINN. L. REV. 1065 (2003) (corresponding "prophets" to Farber's tree huggers
and "priests" to Farber's bean counters).
7. FARBER, supra note 4, at 39-44, 93-132.
8. See J.B. Ruhl, Working Both (Positivist) Ends Toward a New
(Pragmatist)Middle in Environmental Law, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 54246 (2000) (book review) (applying Farber's ideas to ecosystem management

issues).
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other species to vanish from the planet. 9 That possibility does
not immediately cry out for pragmatic solutions, but rather
invokes visions of radical emergency care, measures to be taken
now with questions asked later. There are other matters to
take into consideration, however. Is no expense on behalf of
endangered species too great? Are human rights suspended in
order to protect the rights of other species? Are all species
entitled to this drastic remedial care? Might helping one
species limit our options to help others? These are pragmatic
questions, and they deserve answers before the lawyers,
biologists, and money are mobilized. So, notwithstanding its
very important mission, the ESA must accommodate some room
for balanced, practical approaches. The question is how much.
Part I of this Article lays out the foundations of ecopragmatism as a general approach to questions of that sort,
Fusing
particularly in resource conservation settings.' 0
Farber's treatment of the topic with the work of other
environmental pragmatist philosophers, and taking into
consideration critiques of both, five core principles emerge to
define the school of thought." Three principles define the
instrumental tools of eco-pragmatism. First, it is necessary to
define a set of baseline environmental conditions that will be
a
protected to the maximum extent feasible, and then to define 12
practical behavioral mandate to fulfill that baseline demand.
Pragmatic reasons may help to define this bottom line, but once
defined the line is maintained unyieldingly as far as technology
and money can carry the effort. Second, as a background
decision-making principle to use in the realm where pragmatic
solutions are tolerated, we adopt a variant of what is commonly
9. The statute expresses as one of its central findings that "various
species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States have been rendered
extinct as a consequence of economic growth and development untempered by
adequate concern and conservation." 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1) (2000).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 32-101.
11. The groundwork for Part I of this Article is found in two of my prior
expositions on eco-pragmatism and the "radical middle." See J.B. Ruhl, A
Manifesto for the Radical Middle, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 385, 388-406 (2002); Ruhl,
supra note 8, 542-46. Though borrowing from those sources, the presentation
in Part I of this Article refines and improves upon the general description of
Moreover, although each of the five
eco-pragmatism found therein.
components I lay out in this Article is found in one form or another in Farber's
treatment of the subject, the way in which I structure the overall package, and
the emphasis I place on different components, differs from his approach in

subtle but not insignificant ways.
12.

See infra text accompanying notes 41-50.
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known as the precautionary principle. 13 In short, we err on the
side of safeguarding the environmental baseline. The
precautionary principle, however, is not self-executing-its
magnitude, triggering events, and limits must be defined. One
opposing force, the third pillar of eco-pragmatism, introduces
impact assessment procedures into the case-specific, decisionmaking process. 1 4 Where our knowledge base allows us to be
comfortable that crossing the baseline is a low risk, and that
the consequences of different alternatives are reasonably well
defined and susceptible to comparison, the precautionary
principle can be relaxed in favor of basing decisions on impact
assessment procedures such as cost-benefit analysis.
In addition to these three instrumental principles, ecopragmatism emphasizes a particular model of implementation.
The fourth principle of eco-pragmatism-empiricism-thus
speaks to each of the prior three. 15 Pragmatism is set apart
from positivist philosophies by its reliance on experience and
empirical
knowledge. 16 The
environmental
baseline,
precautionary principle, and impact assessment components,
therefore, must be guided by those same lights of knowledge,
and not become merely disguises for one or the other
environmental extreme. Adaptive management, the fifth pillar
of eco-pragmatism, is the dynamic decision-making process
that administers the unwieldy apparatus.17 Adaptive
management relies on more decentralized, experimentalist,
fluid decision-making instruments than are typical of
conventional environmental policy.' 8
Defined as such, eco-pragmatism finds few friends in the
conventional opposing camps of environmental policy.19
13.

See infra text accompanying notes 51-62.

14.

See infra text accompanying notes 63-72.

15.

See infra text accompanying notes 73-81.

16.

See FARBER, supra note 4, at 9-10; see also infra text accompanying

notes 73-76.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 82-101.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 82-101.
19. Academic reviews of Eco-pragmatism cover the waterfront in terms of
criticism and praise.
Compare Paul Boudreaux, Environmental Costs,
Benefits, and Values: A Review of DanielA. Farber'sEco-pragmatism, 13 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 125, 168 (1999) (faulting Eco-pragmatism for lack of detail),
Richard A. Epstein, Too Pragmatic By Half, 109 YALE L.J. 1639, 1665-66
(2000) (book review) (assigning Eco-pragmatism a "mixed review"-"[it] does

not fall prey to any of the excesses of environmental[ism]," but also does not
sufficiently take into account the strengths of free market environmentalism),
Lisa Heinzerling, Pragmatists and Environmentalists, 113 HARv. L. REV.
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Committed
preservationists
are
repulsed
by
the
balancing
while
accommodation of feasibility and interest
resourcists revile at the prominence of environmental baselines
and the precautionary principle. 20 Both sides laud empiricism
if it leads to information favoring their positions, though almost
no one in either camp is very fond of adaptive management in
its purest form. 2 1 Particularly in a context as prone to policy
warfare as has been the ESA, the prospect of widespread
endorsement of eco-pragmatism could look awfully dim.
Enter Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Department of the
Interior (DOI) during the Clinton administration and the
person who will receive my vote as the most valuable ecopragmatist of the 20th century. 22 With all due respect to
Farber, Babbitt made it happen, and his unlikely laboratory
was t!-3 contentious ESA. As Part II of this Article details,
Babbitt instituted an agenda of administrative reform of the
23
ESA that accords seamlessly with the eco-pragmatist tenets.
During his tenure as DOI Secretary, the agency remained
committed to the ESA's environmental baseline through
1421, 1433 (2000) (book review) (writing that "Farber ignores the
transformative potential of law itself"), and David Roe, Green Scholarship, 3
GREEN BAG 2D 97 (1999) (book review) (criticizing Eco-pragmatism on a
variety of bases), with Stuart Bell, Book Review, 13 J. ENVTL L. 107, 112
(2002) (praising Eco-pragmatism for explaining the theory behind and
practical application of environmental laws), Calestous Juma, Courting
Success for the Future, 399 NATURE 653, 654 (1999) (concluding that the
"pragmatic approach should lead to an ecological renaissance"), Bryan
McDonald, Book Review, 14 SOc'Y & NAT. RESOURCES 545, 546 (2001),
Rutherford H. Platt, Book Review, 66 J. AM. PLANNING ASS'N 212, 213 (2000),
and Christopher H. Schroeder, Clear Consensus, Ambiguous Commitment, 98
MICH. L. REV. 1876, 1915 (2000) (book review). For Farber's rejoinder to one
of these reviews, see Daniel Farber, Green Scholarship-An Oxymoron?, 3
GREEN BAG 2D 231 (2000) (responding to Roe, supra). For a thoughtful
discussion of environmental pragmatism in juxtaposition to other theories of
environmental policy, see Keith Hirokawa, Some Pragmatic Observations
About Radical Critique in Environmental Law, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L. REV. 225
(2002).
20. See infra note 221 and accompanying text. The preservationist/
resourcist distinction parallels Farber's tree hugger/bean counter dichotomy.
See J. Baird Callicott & Karen Mumford, Ecological Sustainability as a
Conservation Concept, 11 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 32, 34 (1997).
21. See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
22. For comprehensive and thoughtful "insider" accounts of Secretary
Babbitt's tenure at the DOI, see John D. Leshy, The Babbitt Legacy at the
Department of the Interior: A Preliminary View, 31 ENVTL. L. 199 (2001);
Joseph L. Sax, Environmental Law at the Turn of the Century: A Reportorial
Fragmentof ContemporaryHistory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2375 (2000).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 102-228.
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designation of hundreds of species as endangered and rigorous
enforcement of the ESA's core behavioral mandate.2 4 It also
leaned heavily on the precautionary principle to err on the side
of species conservation in many contexts. 25 At the same time,
however, a balancing force in the form of case-specific impact
assessment emerged through programs such as Habitat
Conservation Plans. 26 In all these respects scientific standards
grew more rigorous,2 7 and adaptive management became the
explicit theme of agency implementation of the ESA in many
contexts. 2 8 Overall, Babbitt took the ESA, a statute that was
itself in danger of extinction, 29 and turned it into the first
environmental law that could fairly be described as being
implemented in the vein of eco-pragmatism.
Is this a good thing? I think it is, for two reasons. First, it
disproves any idea that the ESA must be conceived, described,
and implemented only in purely moralistic terms. The ESA is,
unquestionably, motivated by normative concerns, but it is
capable of being implemented through pragmatic instruments.
Indeed, as I hope to show herein, its normative concerns may
be better implemented through eco-pragmatism than through
continued narrow reliance on the moral underpinnings that
motivated the initiative in the first place.
Second, ecopragmatism has breathed new life into the ESA; it rejuvenated
it. In so doing, eco-pragmatism has expanded the reach and
potential of species conservation. It may no longer roam with
the tenacity of a pit bull, but at least it's there in more places
and contexts. Overall, the implementation of the ESA within
an eco-pragmatic framework (or, as I see it, the discovery of its
eco-pragmatic soul) brings what I believe to be a promising new
potential to the ESA.
There is one loose end, however, in the form of the
"recovery" goal of the ESA.30 As Part III of this Article
explains, the ESA's pronounced purpose is not simply to stave
off extinction, but to bring species back to the point of longterm viability. The eco-pragmatic model of the ESA described
herein, which reflects its actual implementation, has rescued
24. See infra text accompanying notes 201-02.
25.

See infra text accompanying notes 203-04.

26. See infra text accompanying
27. See infra text accompanying
28. See infra text accompanying
29. See infra text accompanying
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (2000).

notes 205-06.
note 180.
notes 215-20.
note 201.
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many species from extinction, but has recovered few to a stable,
lasting health. 3' The ESA contains all the switches necessary
to turn its "no extinction" baseline into a "promote recovery"
baseline, but they simply have not been turned on. Does this
expose a soft side to eco-pragmatism, or simply a smart,
pragmatic implementation policy? Either view has some merit,
and it is not a debate I can close definitively. I suspect,
moreover, that the persistence of the issue will provide fuel to
detractors of the eco-pragmatic model of the ESA, those who
believe it should be the pit bull of environmental law.
Alas, even the post-Babbitt ESA does not provide
completely satisfying answers to the eco-pragmatist's quest. It
does not quiet all of eco-pragmatism's critics, nor is it even the
law this eco-pragmatist would draft were I king; however, it is
a good start. Even more so, the way in which it has in recent
years been implemented points clearly in the direction of ecopragmatic solutions. Somewhere down that road may be a new
statutory initiative, one more consciously centered on ecopragmatic approaches. In the meantime, I hope we hold off the
extremists and stay the course Babbitt charted for us, for it is
fundamentally eco-pragmatic in spirit-and it works.
I. THE FIVE PILLARS OF ECO-PRAGMATISM
The general approach of eco-pragmatism (and of Ecopragmatism) is to meld classical American pragmatist
philosophy 32 with modern ecological sciences. 33 The package as
31. See infra text accompanying note 239.
32. Farber has written extensively on the more general philosophy of legal
pragmatism.
See e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the
Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1334-78 (1988); Daniel A. Farber, Parody
Lost/Pragmatism Regained: The Ironic History of the Coase Theorem, 83 VA.
L. REV. 397, 421-28 (1997); Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal
Pragmatismfor the Twenty-First Century, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 163. Legal

pragmatism "highlights the connection between the new turn in legal thought
and the American pragmatist philosophers," such as Charles Pierce, William

James, Josiah Royce, George Herbert Mead, John Dewey, and their
contemporaries, who began forging the theory in the late 1800s. Farber, Legal
Pragmatismand the Constitution, supra,at 1337. Eco-pragmatismrepresents

Farber's application of legal pragmatism in the environmental law and policy
context. A group of path-breaking modern environmental philosophers have
tapped into the classical American pragmatism foundations in ways consistent
with Farber's
description of eco-pragmatism. See ENVIRONMENTAL
PRAGMATISM (Andrew Light & Eric Katz eds., 1996) (containing a collection of
essays that contribute to an understanding of pragmatism as it relates to
environmental philosophy). It is important to note that classical American
pragmatism, legal pragmatism, and eco-pragmatism are formal philosophies of
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a whole is designed to address what Farber describes as the
fundamental challenges to environmental law. 34 First, all
decisions in environmental law involve some trade-off between
costs and benefits in terms of resource allocation and social
welfare. 35 How do we know when the costs are too much to
bear relative to the benefits?
Second, most decisions in
environmental law address issues to which some degree of
scientific uncertainty attaches. 36 How do we know what to do
when we do not know what will happen? Third, even if our
policy is based purely on economic factors, we need to establish
some minimum level of environmental protection in order to
sustain the economy. 37 What is that minimum level of
protection? Fourth, all environmental law decisions have
consequences in the present and in the future. 38 How should
we structure our decision process today so as to fulfill whatever
goals we have for the future? Finally, the environment, as a
constantly evolving system, will not wait for us to be perfectly
happy with our answers to all the preceding questions. 39 How
do we know when to promulgate a decision versus when to wait
for more information, input, and deliberation before deciding?
Farber and other modern environmental pragmatists
outline a decision-making process-a philosophy, to be more
precise-that addresses these questions in a way that puts
classical American pragmatism into action. In my
interpretation of their fused body of work, the approach has
five parts, the combination of which defines both the system of
instruments for decision making and the medium for their
implementation.

human interaction with environment and experience; they are distinct from
the lay conception of"pragmatic" as synonymous with "practical-minded." See
Kelly A.
Parker,
Pragmatism and Environmental Thought,
in
ENVIRONMENTAL PRAGMATISM, supra, at 21.

33. This Article is not a comprehensive primer on ecology. For an
excellent lawyers' history of the discipline of ecology and its significant
developments in the last century, see Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock,
The Influence of the Ecological Science on American Law: An Introduction, 69
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 849-73 (1994).

34. See FARBER, supra note 4, at 4-6, 13.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See
See
See
See
See

id. at 3-4.
id. at 5.
id. at 6.
id.
id.
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A. SYSTEM OF INSTRUMENTS
If eco-pragmatism catches on, the term itself may come to
signify an instrument of decision making, the way people
conceive of cost-benefit analysis. As it stands in this early
stage of development, eco-pragmatism is best described as a
system of three instruments: (1) the environmental baseline, (2)
the precautionary principle, and (3) the impact assessment
procedure. 40 What makes the system eco-pragmatic is the way
these three components fit and operate together.
1. Drawing the Environmental Baseline
Eco-pragmatism works from the bottom up-that is, by
a baseline from which all regulatory policy
first establishing
flows. 4' This involves two component determinations: first,
identify the baseline conditions to be protected, and second,
express the practical behavioral directives necessary to ensure
such protection. 42 In other words, what do we care about most,
and what are we going to do about it? While conventional
environmental law scholarship often casts these choices in
purely normative, outcome-driven terms, eco-pragmatists bring
a process dimension to the question-i.e., it is a matter of how
we adopt a baseline that "leave[s] us satisfied with the process
of reaching the result."4 3 Pragmatism, however, is not
synonymous with neutrality. It is more concerned with wellreasoned decision making than with advancing pre-defined
political positions.
Farber suggests fulfilling this approach with a strong
version of the feasibility analysis used currently in some
corners of environmental law. 44 Under his formulation, it is
presumed that actions posing a risk to identified baseline
conditions, such as human health and, pertinent to this Article,
the extinction of species, are impermissible except when
required by considerations of feasibility. 45 The environmental
baseline, thus, fulfills the concept forged in environmental
pragmatism philosophy of the "safe minimum standard," which
posits that a natural resource should be protected unless the

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See id. at 12.
See id.
See id. at 12-13.
Id. at 113.
See id. at 116.
Id. at 108-14.
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costs of preservation violate the floating standard of being
"immoderately high."4 6 In other words, the opportunity costs of
47
foregone alternatives matter.
Not every natural resource emerges as a baseline condition
under this approach. Two filters help us screen resources in
this respect. First, other competing values limit how far we
would go on behalf of any natural resource. Where the benefits
of protecting the natural resource are grossly disproportionate
to the costs that doing so imposes on other values, we do not
apply the maximum-extent-feasible principle. 48 Most of us
would not, for example, protect a species, any species, if we
knew the cost to human life would be substantial, or that doing
so would jeopardize the existence of a multitude of other
species. Second, less significant resources do not receive
baseline condition protection. My backyard is not a baseline
condition. The Everglades are. We can distinguish between
the two based on significance as a resource-its contribution to
ecological processes, service value to humans, sensitivity to
disturbance, and so on.
Ultimately, these two filters mean that the process of
selecting baseline conditions in the form of natural resource
protection goals involves normative decisions. Identifying the
competing values and the criteria of significance opens the door
to normative decisions about what counts and what doesn't,
and thus to controversy. 49 The point is that eco-pragmatism (a)
demands that we identify the baseline conditions, (b) bases
their identification on a pragmatic test for competing values
and significance, and (c) once identified, expresses practical
behavioral directives to ensure the baseline conditions are
protected to the maximum extent feasible.
Of course, establishing the baseline conditions and the
appropriate behavioral safeguards attached to them does not
end the eco-pragmatist's inquiry. While most resources are not
baseline conditions, my backyard for example, that does not

46. See Emery N. Castle, A Pluralistic, Pragmatic and Evolutionary
Approach to NaturalResource Management, in ENVIRONMENTAL PRAGMATISM,
supra note 32, at 231, 246.
47. See id.
48. See FARBER, supra note 4, at 114-16, 131-32.
49. See Schroeder, supra note 19, at 1881-82 (commenting on Farber's
"disproportionate costs proviso" and "insignificance proviso"). My description
of the eco-pragmatic baseline principle is a variation on Farber's, influenced by
the work of other environmental pragmatists.
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mean they are altogether insignificant. Eco-pragmatism, thus,
must supply a decision-making framework for what to do with
these "ordinary" resources.5 0 For that I turn to the
precautionary principle and impact assessment methods and,
more importantly, how they are conjoined in the system of ecopragmatic instruments.
2. Institutionalizing the Precautionary Principle
In Farber's version of eco-pragmatism, a guiding principle
for resolving questions of doubt on all applications of the
feasibility baseline should be the so-called precautionary
principle-when in doubt, exercise caution. 5 1 The precautionary
principle is no stranger to environmental policy thought, and
Farber is not alone in his calling for its explicit and widespread
adoption as a central principle of environmental law and its
eco-pragmatist baseline. 52 In the pragmatist spirit, however, I
suggest that more deliberation over the role of the
precautionary principle is called for.
Although many syntactic versions of the precautionary
principle exist throughout the laws of many nations and in the
text of many international treaties, 53 the 1992 Rio Declaration
Environment and
of the United Nations Conference on
54
Development provides a useful prototype:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall
be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
costscientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
55
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
50. For thoughts on how environmental policy loses track of "ordinary
nature" and why it should not, see Holly Doremus, Biodiversity and the
Challenge of Saving the Ordinary, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 325, 333-54 (2002), and
Holly Doremus, The Special Importance of OrdinaryPlaces, 23 ENVIRONS 3, 316 (2000).
51. See FARBER, supra note 4, at 170-74.
52.

See, e.g., PERSPECTIVES ON THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (Ronnie

Harding & Elizabeth Fisher eds., 1999); PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH & THE
ENVIRONMENT:

IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY

PRINCIPLE (Carolyn

Raffensperger & Joel Tickner eds., 1999) (providing an overview of the
precautionary principle as applied in national and international law contexts).
53. See Christopher D. Stone, Is There a PrecautionaryPrinciple?, 31
ENVTL. L. REP. 10790, 10790-91 (2001) (describing and explaining different
versions).
54. U.N. CONFERENCE ON ENV'T & DEV., AGENDA 21: THE UNITED
NATIONS PROGRAMME OF ACTION FROM RIO at 9 (Rio Declaration on

Environment and Development), U.N. Sales No. E.93.I.11 (1993).
55. Id. at 10 (Principle 15). There are numerous variations on this theme,
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Ignorance, in other words, should not justify the decision either
to move forward with a proposed action that might threaten the
environment, or to not regulate an activity on behalf of the
56
environment.
Clearly, "this idea is supposed to run counter to standard
decision-making procedures (e.g., cost-benefit analysis), in
57
which possible but unproven causal connections do not count."
As such, it has become the darling of preservationists, because
it allows them to disguise their moral positivism as a kind of
reasoned, neutral formula for decision making. Indeed, in
theory the principle does lend itself to a technically-minded
interpretation: We are to evaluate the magnitude and nature of
potential risks to the environment, assess the body of scientific
evidence about those risks and their causes, and devise costeffective measures when the potential risk is high and the
evidence of causation is incomplete. 58 The only normative
component in that expression of the framework is the decision
to favor the environment (as opposed, say, to the economy)
when the stated conditions exist.
In practice, however, preservationists almost always get
around to fitting these concepts around an idea that would
'59
more appropriately be called the "catastrophe principle.
Under this application, if we can identify a proposed activity

with different emphases on the level of risk, the type of harm, the degree of
uncertainty, and the character of the response. Stone, supra note 53, at

10799. This variety of expressions, and the failure of any one to rise to
dominance, has led one commentator to conclude that "the precautionary
principle-both the law and the literature-is in disarray. To begin with,
there is no 'the' precautionary principle there. There are droves of different

versions, none of which is particularly helpful.... I am questioning the claim
that there is a precautionary principle." Id.
56. See Gail Charnley & E. Donald Elliott, Risk Versus Precaution:
Environmental Law and Public Health Protection, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10363,

10363 (2002) ("Support for the precautionary principle is motivated in part by
a desire for a more agile legal system that does not use incomplete science as a
reason to postpone regulating.").
57. Neil A. Manson, Formulatingthe PrecautionaryPrinciple, 24 ENVTL.
ETHICS 263, 264 (2002); see also Charnley & Elliott, supra note 56, at 10364

("The rise of the precautionary principle can be viewed as an objection to the
U.S. legal tradition of extensive administrative law requirements and court
review of the factual basis of government decisions about environmental
risks.").
58.

See Manson, supra note 57, at 264-65. Manson does a superb job of

articulating the precautionary principle in formal logic terms, showing its
embedded formulaic qualities. See id.
59. Id. at 270.
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and an environmental effect such that the environmental effect
is catastrophic and it is merely possible that the proposed
activity causes the catastrophic environmental effect, then the
imposition of the precautionary remedy is justified regardless
60
of the probability that the proposed activity causes the effect.
The catastrophe principle, thus, shifts an impossible burden
onto the advocates of the proposed activity, making it appear
that the preservationists' argument has advanced from
"scientific" and "cost-benefit" principles, when in fact they have
no intention of ever engaging in such a debate. Indeed, at this
extreme the precautionary principle rewards ignorance as
61
much as does incomplete cost-benefit analysis.
Recognizing the folly made possible by that approach,
Farber would apply the precautionary principle not based on
worst-case scenarios but rather as a burden of proof on
regulated entities to demonstrate their activities will do no
harm. 62 This fails, however, to answer how speculative the
case of harm must be before the regulated entity is relieved of
the burden. I agree that such a burden is appropriate when the
evidence indicates that the environmental baseline is
threatened by the kind of activity a regulated entity
contemplates in its proposed action. In that case, the regulated
entity should be required to demonstrate that there is
something different about its circumstances. For example, if
we know a species is endangered, and the evidence strongly
indicates that habitat loss in a particular area is the cause,
development projects that propose additional habitat loss in the
area ought to be subject to this burden of proof.
The point is that the precautionary principle explicitly
anticipates variable conditions in our knowledge of (1) the
threat to the baseline, and (2) the effect of the proposed action
and its alternatives. Hence, the burden of proof ought to be
variable as well, so that caution has less influence in the
decision outcome as the data relevant to the decision become
more reliable and robust. Indeed, at some point along that

60. See id. (stating a more technical expression of the principle).
61. See Charnley & Elliott, supra note 56, at 10365 ("There is a danger
that if applied in the extreme, the precautionary principle will be used as a
license to ignore [the] elements of risk management decisionmaking.");
Manson, supra note 57, at 274 (warning that the precautionary principle
should include "some sort of pledge to continue research, for otherwise the
formulation might have the effect of rewarding ignorance").
62. FARBER, supra note 4, at 171.
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spectrum of information quality the burden should shift to
those making the case for exercising caution. To implement
this shifting burden I turn to the next component of the ecopragmatic system of instruments-impact assessment.
3. Integrating Impact Assessment
As much as the environmental baseline and precautionary
principle are of primary importance to the eco-pragmatic
approach, the rhetoric often associated with them can obscure
the need to keep instrumental values in sight.63 How, in other
words, do we keep the tree huggers from running rampant with
the baseline and precaution? For this purpose we turn in casespecific decision settings to impact assessment procedures,
such as cost-benefit analysis, 64 so as "to ensure we do not allow
our commitment to environmental ideals to turn into
fanaticism." 65 The trick is to ensure that the instrumental
values analysis will only "assist rather than control regulatory
decisions."6 6 Farber thus nests cost-benefit analysis within the
other principles of eco-pragmatism to ensure that the
purportedly neutral science of cost-benefit analysis does not
lead to decisions that run afoul of important social values-i.e.,
"our national commitment to the environment." 67
To that concern I would add that impact assessment
analyses, particularly in the context of environmental
protection, are immeasurably complicated once indirect effects
of a proposed action are considered. 68 Even assuming the direct
effects of a proposed action can be reliably calculated, all of the
indirect effects cannot be reliably identified and quantified ex
ante. Simply being aware that indirect effects can occur does
not make them any more susceptible to complete identification
and quantification. At best, pre-decision review can attempt to
cabin the scope of indirect effects analysis, which can be done
based only on normative considerations and which produces

63. See id. at 113-23, 170-74.
64.

For a survey of cost-benefit analysis and related impact assessment

procedures, see Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 225-38 (1999).
65. FARBER, supra note 4, at 119.
66. Id. at 122-23.

67. Id. at 122.
68. See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1218-19 (5th
Cir. 1991) (illustrating the wildly varying outcomes of cost-benefit analysis

depending on the defined scope of indirect effects).
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only a local sense of overall effects. The nature of indirect
effects, however, is that effects of large magnitude can be
experienced far away from the substantive, geographic, and
temporal locus of the proposed action under study. 69 Anything
less than a global analysis thus leaves open the possibility that
a significant indirect effect, even if it could be predicted (which
it cannot), will not enter the cost-benefit accounting. In most
cases, however, a truly global analysis would be far too time
consuming and costly to allow decision making to proceed in
due course, and it would probably get many estimates of effects
wrong in any event. Hence, the tighter the scope of impact
analysis is cabined, the higher the potential for missing these
69. This quality is true of any complex system, such as the environment.
Although the study of such systems can be quite technical in substance, many
of the recent and most influential works in the field focus on applications of
the technical theory to real world phenomena, such as ecosystems and
biological evolution. See, e.g., JOHN L. CASTI, COMPLEXIFICATION: EXPLAINING
THE PARADOXICAL WORLD THROUGH THE SCIENCE OF SURPRISE (1994); JACK
COHEN & IAN STEWART, THE COLLAPSE OF CHAOS: DISCOVERING SIMPLICITY
IN A COMPLEX WORLD (1994); MURRAY GELL-MANN, THE QUARK AND THE
JAGUAR: ADVENTURES IN THE SIMPLE AND THE COMPLEX (1994); BRIAN
GOODWIN, HOW THE LEOPARD CHANGED ITS SPOTS: THE EVOLUTION OF
COMPLEXITY (1994); JOHN HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER: How ADAPTATION
BUILDS COMPLEXITY (1995); STEVEN JOHNSON, EMERGENCE: THE CONNECTED
LIVES OF ANTS, BRAINS, CITIES, AND SOFTWARE (2001); STUART KAUFFMAN,
AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE: THE SEARCH FOR LAWS OF SELF-ORGANIZATION
AND COMPLEXITY (1995); RICARD SOLP & BRIAN GOODWIN, SIGNS OF LIFE:
How COMPLEXITY PERVADES BIOLOGY (2000). Complexity theory and the

science of complex adaptive systems have radically altered the way in which
scientists study physical systems as mundane as a dripping faucet and as
grand as the weather. For centuries, the classical scientific method has
approached such behavior in a reductionist manner, intent on studying
components of whole complex systems at their most irreducible levels, based
on the premise that by understanding how each part works in its simplest
form, we can understand how the whole system works. See CASTI, supra, at
172; COHEN & STEWART, supra, at 33-34. The advent of high-speed computers
that allow system modeling at levels of detail never before imagined opened
the door to the alternative view of systems that complexity theory posits.
JOHN L. CASTI, WOULD-BE WORLDS: HOW SIMULATION IS CHANGING THE

FRONTIERS OF SCIENCE 35 (1997). Although it is relatively young as a
scientific discipline, complexity theory has already emerged as an important
force in virtually every field of the physical sciences as well as in a wide array
of the social sciences. For histories of the development of complexity theory,
see JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE (1987); ROGER LEWIN,
COMPLEXITY: LIFE AT THE EDGE OF CHAOS (1992); M. MITCHELL WALDROP,
COMPLEXITY: THE EMERGING SCIENCE AT THE EDGE OF ORDER AND CHAOS

(1992). Current information about the field is best obtained from the journal
Complexity. See, e.g., John H. Holland, Explaining the Evolution of
Complexity in Signaling Networks, COMPLEXITY, Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 34-45
(describing adaptive evolution of complexity in a signaling network model).
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distant effects; but the wider the scope of analysis is opened,
unreliable is the process of
the more difficult, costly, and
70
assessing total indirect effects.
In the eco-pragmatic view, therefore, cost-benefit analysis
and other impact assessment procedures are most useful, are
most pragmatic, when we use normative principles to define
their purpose and scope. In case-specific applications of ecopragmatism, then, the normatively-defined environmental
baseline and the normatively-directed precautionary principle
set the stage for when cost-benefit analysis is considered
appropriate and its findings used as strongly influential in the
decision-making process. Of course, a programmatic level of
cost-benefit analysis is used to help define the environmental
baseline in the first place, in that it assists in identifying cases
of disproportionate costs and insignificant benefits that may
result from extensive new regulatory programs (e.g., whether
generally to protect endangered species) or large-scale land and
resource development decisions (e.g., whether generally to
allow ocean mineral extraction). That
is where Farber largely
7
puts and keeps cost-benefit analysis. '
In my framework for eco-pragmatism, by contrast, impact
assessment procedures return to the analysis in case-specific
decision scenarios (e.g., whether to build a particular road in an
endangered species's identified habitat) as the counterweight to
the precautionary principle. As the available body of relevant
data becomes more robust and reliable, we become more
comfortable that we can evaluate the risks a particular decision
poses to the prescribed environmental baseline, and we
understand more about the direct and indirect effects to
interests of concern that flow from different case-specific
decision alternatives. In those instances it is appropriate that,
as the information becomes increasingly robust and reliable, we
depart increasingly from the precautionary principle and move
increasingly toward impact assessment procedures as the basis
for decision. 72 As the two decision-making workhorses of eco70. See Adler & Posner, supra note 64, at 241-45 (describing cost-benefit
analysis as a "useful decision procedure [that] should be routinely used by
agencies," but also recognizing that "there are significant procedural costs in
any scheme of multidimensional assessment where the number of prespecified dimensions is large").
71. See FARBER, supra note 4, at 93-123.
72. Charnley and Elliott argue, for example, that
the alleged choice between risk assessment and the precautionary
principle is a false opposition. Risk assessment provides just part of
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pragmatism, therefore, the precautionary principle and impact
assessment should work along reverse sliding scales in terms of
their influence in specific settings, and thus impose a shifting
burden of proof between those advocating precaution with
respect to a case-specific decision and those proposing to base
the decision on impact analysis, as represented in the following
model.

Figure 1: The Precautionary Principle and Cost-Benefit
Analysis in Case-Specific Decision Settings

Burden of proof shifts
c of

Rely on results of
impact assessment

dccision-making
principle

Exercise precaution

Degree of certainty that (a) the proposed action does not threaten the
environmental baseline and (b) the effects of decision alternatives with
respect to the proposed action are known

This, I propose, represents the essential model of ecopragmatism-the way in which the environmental baseline,
precautionary principle, and impact assessment procedure fit
together in a working system of instruments. It is, in other
words, the litmus test for whether a regulatory program is ecothe information used to protect public health and the environment.
The extent to which the precautionary principle is applied in
regulatory decisionmaking depends partly on the confidence that can
be placed in a risk assessment as well as on the nature and severity of
the risk of concern, the likelihood that new data would change a risk
management decision, the effectiveness and feasibility of the risk
management action under consideration, and a wide variety of other
considerations such as politics, public health, economics, and the law.
Charnley & Elliott, supra note 56, at 10365. Other commentators have
suggested that cost-benefit analysis and the precautionary principle can coexist and even lend mutual structure, see Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling CostBenefit Analysis with the Principle that Safety Matters More than Money, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 114, 120-21 (2001), and that cost-benefit analysis is most
useful as a welfarist instrument, see Adler & Posner, supra note 64, at 194.
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pragmatic. If this structure is not embedded in the program,
the program is not and cannot be implemented ecopragmatically. If it is in place, however, what next?
B. MEDIUM OF IMPLEMENTATION

Eco-pragmatism is about more than assembling the three
core decision-making instruments into a system; equally as
important is how the system is put into action. The reverse
sliding scales, shifting burden of proof system can only work on
a diet of robust, reliable information fed to an ongoing, adaptive
decision-making culture.
The last two pillars of ecopragmatism-empiricism and adaptive management-thus are
necessary and essential ingredients.
1. The Importance of Empiricism
The reverse sliding scales, shifting burdens of proof
framework on which I propose to place the precautionary
principle and cost-benefit analysis begs the question of how we
achieve degrees of certainty as to threats to the environmental
baseline and effects of decision alternatives. By placing the
precautionary principle and impact assessment procedures in
contraposition, but requiring them to work together, ecopragmatism fulfills the core tenet of classical pragmatist
philosophy-moral pluralism. One of the bedrock principles of
eco-pragmatism is the rejection of positivist philosophies of the
environment, replacing them with a heavy dose of experience
and empiricism.
This reflects the American pragmatists'
strongly held conviction that "[a]ttempts to set down the 'final
word' on what is right have a disturbing tendency to show up
as incomplete, ambiguous or quaintly archaic in the next
generation," 73 and finds good company in those modern
environmental pragmatists who are "highly critical of any
notion of absolutes in either knowledge or metaphysics." 74
Indeed, to the extent that battling positivist theories frame
issues, as Farber says is the case in modern environmental
policy, 7 5 pragmatism often leads to a striving for
"metatheoretical
compatibilism between
the opposing

73. See Parker, supra note 32, at 26.
74. Andrew Light & Eric Katz, Introduction: Environmental Pragmatism
and Environmental Ethics as Contested Terrain, in ENVIRONMENTAL
PRAGMATISM, supra note 32, at 1, 7.
75. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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76

theories."
Eco-pragmatism thus rejects moral foundationalism and
assumes moral pluralism."7 That, of course, is a serious
challenge to conventional environmental policy discourse. As
Light and Katz observe, one of the troubling features of modern
environmental ethics scholarship is the speed with which it
reached the "narrow predisposition that only a small set of
approaches in the field is worthwhile," such that the only
"adequate and workable environmental ethics must embrace
non-anthropocentrism, holism, moral monism, and, perhaps, a
commitment to some form of intrinsic value."7 8 Pragmatism, by
contrast, "maintains that no set of ethical concepts can be the
absolute foundation for evaluating the rightness of our
79
actions."
Central in the pragmatist approach, therefore, is a
willingness to test and discard theory where it does not fit the
experience, rather than try to shape outcomes to fit the
theory.8 0 Thus, classical American pragmatism emphasizes a
"practice over theory" approach in which "attention to the
specific context of action reveals a methodology explicitly
pragmatic, in that practice precedes the development of
theory." 81 Empiricism, in other words, is the glue that holds
together the moral and instrumental components of ecopragmatism. Our moral commitment to the environment
motivates the use of the environmental baseline and
precautionary principle, but we depend on experience and
empirical support for their formulations in specific policy
contexts. Instrumental values grow in influence over decision
making only as experience and empirical support justify.
Empiricism must play this role-it must place demands on the
moral and instrumental sides of eco-pragmatism-lest either
side use ignorance to its advantage.
2. Adaptive Management
Eco-pragmatism's
hybridization
of
environmental
baselines, the precautionary principle, and impact assessment
procedures calls for something other than business as usual in
76. Light & Katz, supra note 74, at 11.
77.

See Hirokawa, supra note 19, at 247-53.

78. Light & Katz, supra note 74, at 2.
79.
80.
81.

Parker, supra note 32, at 26.
See Hirokawa, supra note 19, at 250-52.
Light & Katz, supra note 74, at 10.
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environmental law. A central point in Farber's thesis is that,
however the hybrid approach might direct us to regulate today
for a given issue, we have to be ready to revisit the question in
the future as our knowledge base improves and environmental
and economic conditions change. We must, in other words,
design environmental law around a "centrality of learning to
the enterprise."8 2 This approach is characteristic of classical
American pragmatists, who described nature as a complex
system and human relations to it therefore equally as rich and
varied. 83 Unfortunately, environmental law has not evolved in
its short lifetime to become a particularly adept, nimble, and
inquisitive student. Hence we find ourselves in the position of
having to raise our "regulatory IQ" and teach the elephant how
84
to waltz.
This recipe for making environmental law more dynamic is
found in the literature in ecological sciences and environmental
pragmatism philosophy, which frequently demands that
"policies... be evaluated on the basis of their capacity to take
new information into account and thereby provide for
adaptation and change." 85 The term in common usage for this
style of governance is adaptive management. 86 Adaptive
management theory traces its origins to C.S. Holling's
influential book from the late 1970s, Adaptive Environmental
Assessment and Management.8 7 Holling and his fellow
researchers found conventional environmental management
methods at odds with the emerging model of ecosystem
82.
83.

FARBER, supra note 4, at 179.
See Hugh P. McDonald, Dewey's Naturalism, 24 ENVTL. ETHICS 189,

193 (2002).
84. See FARBER, supra note 4, at 179.
85. Castle, supra note 46, at 247.
86. For a more comprehensive treatment of the American pragmatist
roots of modern adaptive management theory, see Bradley C. Karkkainen,
Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty Defaults: Toward a
Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943, 948-60 (2003) [hereinafter
Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management].
Karkkainen elsewhere
describes the application of adaptive management principles to a variety of

ecosystem management oriented programs and policies.

See Bradley C.

Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and
Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 200-33 (2001-02) [hereinafter Karkkainen,
CollaborativeEcosystem Governance].
87. ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (C.S.

Holling ed., 1978) [hereinafter ADAPTIVE]; see, e.g., Kai N. Lee & Jody
Lawrence, Adaptive Management: Learning from the Columbia River Basin
Fish and Wildlife Program, 16 ENVTL. L. 431, 442 n.45 (1986) (tracing the

term "adaptive management" to Holling's book).
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dynamics. 88 They focused on four basic properties of ecological
systems to provide the premises of their new management
method.8 9 First, although the parts of ecological systems are
connected, not all parts are strongly or intimately connected
with all other parts. 90 It cannot possibly be the case, for
example, that every species in an ecosystem depends for its
survival on the survival of every other species. Second, events
are not uniform over space, meaning, for example, that impacts
of habitat loss do not gradually dilute with distance. 9 1 In
particular, induced and other indirect effects of land
developments such as pipelines and water reservoirs may be of
greatest magnitude at distant points. Third, ecological systems
exhibit multi-equilibrium states between which the system may
move for unpredictable reasons, in unpredictable manners, and
at unpredictable times. 92 Small variations in conditions such
as temperature, nutrient content, or species composition can
"flip" ecosystems into vastly different behavioral states,
93
sometimes well after the event that started the reaction.
Finally, Holling's group observed that because ecosystems are
not static but in continual change, environmental quality is not
achieved by eliminating change. 94 Flood, fire, heat, cold,
drought, and storm continually test ecosystems, enhancing
resilience through system "self-correction. ''95 The upshot is
that the unexpected can happen, making it difficult to predict
when, where, and to what degree policy outcomes depart from
expectations.
Under this model of ecosystems, they concluded,
management policy must put a premium on collecting
information, establishing measurements of success, monitoring
outcomes, using new information to adjust existing approaches,
and a willingness to change. 96 Whereas resourcists and
preservationists have battled to "lock in" positions through
fixed rules and standards and preserve every inch of

88.
89.

ADAPTIVE, supra note 87, at 1.
Id. at 26-34.

90. Id. at 26-28.
91.

Id. at 28-29.

92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 30-33.
Id.
Id. at 33-34.
Id.

96.

Id. at 35.
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incremental ground gained, 97 an adaptive management
framework is more experimentalist, relying on iterative cycles
of goal determination, performance standard setting, outcome
monitoring, and standard recalibration. 98 The biologist Simon
Levin recently defined it concisely as "maintaining flexibility in
management structures and adjusting rules and regimes on the
basis of monitoring and other sources of new data."99 While it
remains a flexible, and at times amorphous decision-making
framework, this brand of adaptive management has evolved
well beyond an idea; indeed, there is broad consensus today
among resource managers and academics that adaptive
management is the only practical way to implement ecosystem
management policy. 00 I would go a step further and say it is
the only effective way to implement eco-pragmatism.101

97. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Environmental "Rule of Law"
Litigation, 17 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 244-54 (2000) (discussing the "rule of
law" legal tactics of environmentalists which attempted to convince the
judiciary that a specific environmental mandate existed).
98. ADAPTIVE, supra note 87, at 37.
99. See SIMON A. LEVIN, FRAGILE DOMINION 200 (1999); see also Simon A.
Levin, Towards a Science of Ecological Management, 3 CONSERVATION
ECOLOGY, Dec. 1999, availableat http://www.consecol.org/vol3/iss2/art6.
100. See Ronald D. Brunner & Tim W. Clark, A Practice-BasedApproach to
Ecosystem Management, 11 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 48, 54-56 (1997); Anne E.
Heissenbuttel, Ecosystem Management-Principlesfor PracticalApplication, 6
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 730, 730 (1996); Paul L. Ringold et al., Adaptive
Monitoring Design for Ecosystem Management, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS
745, 745 (1996). Indeed, the Ecological Society of America's comprehensive
study of ecosystem management treats the use of adaptive management
methods as a given. See Norman L. Christensen et al., The Report of the
Ecological Society of America Committee on the Scientific Basis for Ecosystem
Management, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 665, 670, 676 (1996).
101. This statement raises the broader and more general issue, not fully
explored in this Article, of how to construct models of administrative law
based on pragmatism. Particularly given its emphasis on public participation
and judicial review, conventional administrative law may find itself
uncomfortable with the dynamic form of decision making that eco-pragmatism
anticipates. This is not a reason to reject eco-pragmatism, but rather a
challenge that must be addressed. Indeed, a committed eco-pragmatist,
because of the adaptive management component to the approach, would
include reform of administrative law as a primary goal in the agenda. See
Ruhl, supra note 11, at 403-07; Sydney A. Shapiro, Administrative Law After
the Counter-Reformation: Restoring Faith in Pragmatic Government, 48 U.
KAN. L. REV. 689, 741-48 (2000). Other participants in this Symposium have
addressed this consequence of eco-pragmatism more fully than I do here. See
Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management, supra note 86, at 975-97; A.
Dan Tarlock, Slouching Toward Eden: The Eco-pragmatic Challenges of
Ecosystem Revival, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1173, 1197-1203 (2003).
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II. ECO-PRAGMATISM AND THE ESA
Part I of this Article lays out my general model of ecopragmatism, drawing heavily from Farber's work as well as
that of other philosophers of environmental pragmatism. One
criticism of Eco-pragmatism, however, has been its lack of
detail for what to do in case-specific settings. 10 2 Hence the
main purpose of this Article, to which I now turn in Part II, is
to ask how eco-pragmatism plays out in a concrete setting, in
this case whether the ESA is eco-pragmatic in general
structure as well as in case-specific applications.
Before moving to an analysis of whether the ESA
incorporates and applies each of the five core principles of ecopragmatism, a brief structural overview of the ESA and an
example set of circumstances will assist the discussion.
Depending on the type of species involved, the ESA is
administered by the Secretary of the Department of the
Interior, through its U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) (for
most terrestrial and freshwater species), and the Secretary of
the Department of Commerce, through its National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS) (for most marine and anadromous
species). .0 3
These two agencies administer several core
programs summarized below, the details of which are explored
more fully later in the Article.
* Section 4 authorizes the FWS and the NMFS to
identify endangered and threatened species, known as
the "listing" function, and then to designate "critical
habitat" and develop "recovery plans" for the
species. 104
* Section 7 requires all federal agencies to ensure that
actions they carry out, fund, or authorize do not
jeopardize the continued existence of listed species or
adversely modify their critical habitat. 105
* Section 9 requires that all persons avoid committing
"take" of listed species of fish and wildlife. 106
* Sections 7 and 10 establish a procedure and criteria
for the FWS and the NMFS to approve "incidental

102.
103.

See, e.g., Boudreaux, supra note 19, at 168.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(15), 1533(a) (2000); see also 50 C.F.R. § 17.2 (2001).

104. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)-(f).
105. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
106.

Id. § 1538(a)(1).
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take" of listed species. 107
In order to animate discussion of these provisions in the
context of my eco-pragmatism model, I will use the following
hypothetical case. The FWS has listed Bird, a species of
songbird, as endangered, and has designated several thousand
acres in County as its critical habitat. Federal Agency wishes
to finance a portion of the costs of State's construction of a
hospital within Bird's critical habitat. Developer wishes to
develop a residential subdivision in County, in an area outside
Bird's critical habitat.
A reader unfamiliar with the ESA may find its structure
quite simple and its application in the hypothetical case quite
straightforward. Nothing could be further from reality! The
FWS, County, Federal Agency, State, Developer, and, not least
of all, Bird, are about to dive together into one of the most
convoluted, contentious statutory programs the human mind
has devised. I never said eco-pragmatism is simple, or immune
from controversy. What matters is whether eco-pragmatism
produces sensible, sustainable decisions. The ESA, particularly
after the Babbitt reforms, gets there frequently.
To be sure, there is room for improvement in the fit
between the ESA and the eco-pragmatic model. Indeed, I make
no claim that Congress had eco-pragmatism foremost in mind
when it enacted or amended the ESA. I am forced, therefore, to
"cut and paste" to some extent to find and piece together the
statute's eco-pragmatic qualities, although I believe the
manner in which I do so in no way distorts the statute's
provisions or the practical interpretations they have received in
the agencies or the courts. Even then, I make no attempt here
to reconcile every nook and cranny of ESA law with the ecopragmatic model. Nor do I profess to having come up with the
only way to configure various ESA programs into an ecopragmatic framework. What I do cover amounts to the major
structural and programmatic weight of the ESA, assembled in
a way that fits nicely into the eco-pragmatic model. Hence,
while the ESA is neither explicitly nor completely ecopragmatic in origin or in structure, its record of eco-pragmatic
implementation is improving and the basic foundation is in
place for more movement in the right direction-in the ecopragmatic direction.

107. Id. §§ 1536(b)(4), 1539(a)(1).
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A. SYSTEM OF INSTRUMENTS
Like many federal environmental laws of its vintage, the
ESA has grown through a series of amendments, dozens of
regulatory promulgations,
and hundreds
of judicial
interpretations into a hodgepodge of provisions and programs.
It would be preposterous of me to suggest that anything like
the reverse sliding scales, shifting burden of proof system of
decision-making instruments is to be found in the morass of
ESA law in some neat and tidy package. With the ecopragmatism model in hand, however, I believe I can ferret out
its presence in the ESA. The three key instruments are there
in close approximation to the general eco-pragmatism theme,
and they not only can be, but also often are, worked out
together in a way that maps remarkably well with the general
model.
1. Environmental Baseline: The No Jeopardy Mandate
One does not have to search far in the law and policy of the
ESA to find its environmental baseline: It is "to halt and
reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the
cost."' 08 The starting point for that endeavor is section 4 of the
ESA, authorizing the FWS and the NMFS to identify, or "list,"
any species that is endangered or threatened with extinction
throughout all or a significant portion of its range.10 9 Once the
agency has listed a species, it must also designate the species's
"critical habitat," defined as areas "essential to the
conservation of the species.""10
In our hypothetical, for
108. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978).
109. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a), (c) (listing authority); id. § 1532(6), (20)
(definitions of endangered and threatened).
110. Id. § 1532(5)(A)(i). For a description of the critical habitat designation
process, see Murray D. Feldman & Michael J. Brennan, The Growing
Importance of Critical Habitat for Species Conservation, 16 NAT. RESOURCES
& ENVT 88, 88-90 (2001); Robert Wiygul & Heather Weiner, Critical Habitat
Destruction, ENVTL. F., May-June 1999, at 12, 13-21. Critical habitat has in

recent years been the subject of tremendous controversy regarding the
agencies' failure to complete designations for many listed species. Critical
habitat is designated concurrently with the final listing rule unless the listing
agency decides either that the listing action should not be delayed while the
critical habitat designation is being completed, or that additional time of up to
one year is needed to make the necessary biological and other determinations
relating to critical habitat. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C). The listing agency can
decline to designate critical habitat if it finds that designation would not be'
prudent. Id. § 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii). Courts generally have held the Service strictly
to those deadlines and to the duty to designate critical habitat. See, e.g.,
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example, the FWS has listed Bird as endangered and has
designated its critical habitat, which is found exclusively in
County.
This package of listed species with critical habitat, both of
which are decisions made about a species in general, defines
the relevant baseline conditions for purposes of the ESA.
Appropriately, economics does not play a significant role in this
description of baseline conditions. For example, in reaching
their species listing decisions, the ESA explicitly limits the
agencies to considering "solely ...the best scientific and
commercial data available."'1 1 Congress clearly described the
purpose of that provision as "prevent[ing] non-biological
considerations from affecting such decisions." 1 2 When the
FWS was considering whether to list Bird, for example, it could
not consider the effect listing would have on the various plans
of Federal Agency, State, or Developer, or on the economic
conditions in County generally.
Eco-pragmatism's disproportionate costs and insignificance
provisos, however, are both at play to define outer limits in this
respect, albeit their effect is not to carve out much from the
baseline. For example, the listing agency must assess the
economic impacts of critical habitat designation and "may
exclude any area from critical habitat if [the Secretary]
determines that the benefits of such exclusion outweigh the
benefits of specifying such area as part of the critical habitat,
unless ... failure to designate such area as critical habitat will
result in the extinction of the species concerned."" 13 Similarly,
Natural Res. Def. Council v. United States Dep't of Interior, 113 F.3d 1121,
1124-27 (9th Cir. 1997). Nevertheless, the FWS has an unmistakable policy
aversion to designating critical habitat, arguing on many occasions that it
"provides little or no conservation benefit despite the great cost to put it in
place." Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 62 Fed. Reg. 39,129,
39,130 (July 22, 1997) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). In addition, because
few people understand its implications, the FWS believes that the critical

habitat process "can arouse concern and resentment on the part of private
landowners and other interested parties." Id. at 54,020, 54,025.
111.
112.
113.

16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
H.R. REP. No. 97-835, at 19 (1982).
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). The FWS had for many years implemented

this economic impacts analysis under the theory that critical habitat imposes
no substantial impacts above the "baseline" of impacts imposed through the
take prohibition of section 9 and the jeopardy prohibition of section 7, both
discussed infra, and thus no probing analysis of critical habitat (or baseline)
impacts is needed. A court recently demanded, however, that the FWS supply
a thorough analysis of both the baseline and incremental effects. See N.M.

Cattle Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277, 1278, 1285
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species eligible for listing do not include any "species of the
Class Insecta determined by the Secretary to constitute a pest
whose protection... would present an overwhelming and
overriding risk to man." '14 In other words, not all species are
entitled to protection from extinction, and not all essential
habitats are necessarily entitled to critical habitat status.
The practical behavioral expression of the environmental
baseline then follows in section 7(a)(2) of the ESA, wherein
federal agencies are instructed that they
shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary,
insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such
agency (hereinafter in this section referred to as an "agency action") is
not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of habitat of such species which is determined.., to be
critical. '

The FWS and the NMFS have defined "jeopardize the
continued existence of' to mean "to engage in an action that
reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce
appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of
listed species in the wild."" 16 In other words, the ESA draws a
line across which, as a general matter, no federal agency is to
cross: Do not appreciably reduce a listed species's viability.
That line is quite real and powerful. As the Supreme
Court explained in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, equitable
considerations could not relieve the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA) from its duty under the ESA to ensure that its
construction and operation of a dam would not jeopardize the
continued existence of the endangered snail darter." 7 The
Court observed that the "plain intent of Congress in enacting
this statute was to halt and reverse the trend toward species
extinction, whatever the "cost," and that in this regard the ESA
"admits of no exception. '1 8 This baseline has served as the
(10th Cir. 2001) (demanding an analysis of all of the economic impacts of a
critical habitat designation).
114. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6).
115. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
116. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2001).
117. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 & n.19 (1978).
118. Id. at 173, 184. As Farber has pointed out in some of his other work,
the extreme position taken in TVA v. Hill is likely what set into motion the
evolution of endangered species protection toward its present state, which is
defined by more flexible tools such as the Habitat Conservation Plan discussed
infra. See Daniel A. Farber, A Tale of Two Cases, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 33, 37-39
(2001). While not framing that discussion in terms of eco-pragmatism, the
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foundation from which resolution of many case-specific settings
has proceeded since the TVA v. Hill case, leading one
commentator to the following characterization of the ESA:
[The ESA provides] the muscle for the discussions: a reason for them
to take place, and a boundary below which they cannot fall. The
reason is the presence of a salmon, owl, or desert tortoise, an ultimate
indicator species. The boundary is impairment of these species'
ability to maintain viable populations. These determinations119 are
objective, science-based and enforceable. They are law to apply.

This is an eloquent description of an environmental baseline if
ever there was one.
Of course, that is not where eco-pragmatism would leave
matters.
The "no jeopardy" baseline would not be ecopragmatic without room for the caveat "to the maximum extent
feasible." A feasibility standard is embedded in the "no
jeopardy" baseline in two ways. First, when the FWS or the
NMFS concludes from its consultation with the action agency
that jeopardy or adverse modification is likely, it must develop
reasonable alternatives that will allow the action agency to
accomplish the intended purpose of the proposed action without
crossing the baseline. 120 An alternative is reasonable only if it
is "economically and technologically feasible." 12 1 Of course,
there may be no such alternative. What then? There was no
further recourse provided in the statute for that situation at
the time the Court decided TVA v. Hill, leading the Court to
conclude that Congress intended that to be the end of the line
for the action agency's proposed action. 122 Congress added an
escape clause, however, in the 1978 amendments to the ESA to
mediate the Court's "whatever the cost" and "no exceptions"
interpretation of the statute. 23 An agency may cause jeopardy
to a listed species if a committee of federal agency heads,
referred to as the Endangered Species Committee 124 (more
commonly known as the "God Squad"), finds that there are no
reasonable alternatives to the proposed action, the benefits of

time line Farber traces is, in my view, the process that advanced the ESA
toward the eco-pragmatic model. The baseline, in other words, looks pretty
harsh without the remaining apparatus.
119. Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem
Management, 81 MINN. L. REV. 869, 959-60 (1997).
120. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
121. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.

122.

TVA, 437 U.S. at 184.

123.

Id. at 173, 184.

124.

16 U.S.C. § 1536(e).
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the proposed action clearly outweigh the benefits of avoiding
jeopardy, and the action is of regional or national
significance. 125 Even then, such exemptions can be granted
only if all reasonable mitigation measures are employed to
minimize the adverse effects of the action. 126 One would
anticipate few actions meeting those feasibility-based
few such exemptions have been sought,
standards, and in fact
27
much less granted. 1
In Bird's case, for example, Federal Agency's plan to
finance State's hospital will trigger the section 7 consultation
requirement between Federal Agency and the FWS. In most
cases of this sort, the FWS would find that no jeopardy is likely
to result from the project. But the hospital is planned within
Bird's critical habitat, and thus the baseline is more acutely
put at risk. Federal Agency may be prevented from funding
State's project unless State agrees to reasonable alternatives
the FWS believes will remove the risk to the baseline
conditions. It is unlikely State and Federal Agency could
obtain a God Squad exemption from the no jeopardy mandate
in such a case, and thus in all likelihood the hospital project
will be required to undergo design and location revisions that
implement the proposed alternatives.
The overall approach of the ESA to defining its
environmental baseline thus fits remarkably well with the ecopragmatism model: It defines a set of baseline conditions
taking into account narrowly defined cases of grossly
disproportionate costs, and it defines a practical behavior
requirement that decidedly favors the protection of the baseline
from further risk, but which also incorporates a strictly defined
feasibility caveat. As one would expect, most federal agency
actions do not approach the baseline, and the consultation
process established under section 7 is completed with little
fanfare. 128 Yet in those cases where the baseline is put at risk
125. Id. § 1536(h)(1)(A).
126. Id. § 1536(h)(1)(B). If national security is at stake, the exemption may
be granted without the required findings or qualifications. Id. § 1536(j).
127. For a review of the small handful of matters that have even reached
the level of committee review, much less been granted an exemption, see
Patrick A. Parenteau, The Exemption Process and the "God Squad," in
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at
143-51.

128. One study found that for a five-year period in the late 1980s and early
1990s, the FWS reached a "jeopardy" finding in only 131 of 73,560 informal
and formal consultations. Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and
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by proposed federal agency action, courts have consistently and
aggressively implemented the message of TVA v. Hill
notwithstanding the dramatic impacts to agency plans, private
129
interests, and local and regional economies.
The ESA's environmental baseline thus remains clear and
unmistakable in orientation, a line infrequently approached
but guarded tenaciously when it is. It is not always precisely
clear where the line is in specific settings, however. 130 Ecopragmatism must, in other words, be capable of implementing
the generalized baseline concepts of "species," "critical habitat,"

its Implementation by the U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U.
COLO. L. REV. 277, 318-20 (1993). Similarly, the FWS reports that in the
period 1998 through 2001, it conducted over 219,000 consultations, only 367 of
which led to a "jeopardy" finding.
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
CONSULTATIONS
WITH FEDERAL AGENCIES 2
(2002), available at
http://endangered.fws.gov/consultations/consultations.pdf (last visited Jan. 22,
2003).
129. An example that has played prominently in the media this year is the
Klamath River Basin in southern Oregon and northern California, where a set
of biological opinions from the FWS (covering protected sucker fish) and the
NMFS (covering protected coho salmon) forced the Bureau of Reclamation to
shut off irrigation water to over 1000 farms. For detailed accounts of the
incident, see Reed D. Benson, Giving Suckers (and Salmon) an Even Break:
Klamath Basin Water and the Endangered Species Act, 15 TULANE ENVTL. L.J.
197, 198-99 (2002); Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Fish, Farms, and the
Clash of Cultures in the Klamath Basin, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. (forthcoming 2003).
The jeopardy consultation process has also had dramatic effects on logging in
national forests in the Pacific Northwest, and consequently on the economy
and culture of local communities, where numerous endangered birds and fish
depend on forest ecosystems. Laura Hartt, Pacific Coast Federation of
Fishermen's Associations v. NMFS: A Case Study on Successes and Failuresin
Challenging Logging Activities with Adverse Cumulative Effects on Fish and
Wildlife, 32 ENVTL. L. 671, 678-98 (2002); William Stelle, Jr., Implementing
ESA Salmon Listings-Untangling Overlapping Programs, 16 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 112, 112 (2001); Rebecca W. Watson, Ecosystem
Management in the Northwest: "Is Everybody Happy?," 14 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T 173, 174-75 (2000).
130. An example that has received a remarkable level of media and
political attention recently is, once again, the Klamath River Basin, see supra
note 129, where scientists from federal, state, local, and tribal agencies as well
as numerous private and nonprofit institutions have argued incessantly for
years over what conditions will cause jeopardy to several species of sucker and
salmon fish. Benson, supra note 129, at 214-24. A panel of independent
experts from the National Academy of Sciences' National Research Council
recently convened on the matter (of which I was the token lawyer) concluded
in its interim report that there was "no substantial scientific evidence" for
many of the positions the different disputants were maintaining. NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION OF BIOLOGICAL OPINIONS ON
ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN:
INTERIM REPORT 4-5 (Nat'l Academy Press 2002).
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and "jeopardy" in real-world contexts. With the baseline
instrument in hand, then, the eco-pragmatist searches for the
case-specific interplay of precautionary principle and impact
assessment. It is to be found in the ESA.
2. Precautionary Principle: The Take Prohibition
The abstract "take care" message of the precautionary
principle must be reduced to practical behavioral directives in
order to have any meaningful effect in case-specific contexts.
The expression of behavioral directives can be made either as
an affirmative, as in "do good in such a way," or as a negative,
as in "avoid doing harm in such a way." Although there are
glimmers of affirmative expressions in the ESA, they have led
almost nowhere in practical effect. For example, section 7(a)(1)
of the statute provides that federal agencies "shall ...utilize
their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter
by carrying out programs for the conservation of endangered
and threatened species." 131 That has a nice ring to it, certainly
in keeping with the spirit of an affirmative statement of the
precautionary principle. The statute, however, contains no
additional implementing provisions for what, on its face, is a
rather sweeping command. Perhaps recognizing the potentially
boundless implications of this so-called "conservation duty," the
courts have consistently resisted efforts to turn it into a general
statement of affirmative behavioral expectations, leaving it to
the discretion of each federal agency to determine how far to go
132
with the "duty."
No other provision of the statute comes close to section
7(a)(1) in expressing what could reasonably be interpreted as
the affirmative style of the precautionary principle. Many
commentators have nonetheless argued that the ESA
inherently demands implementation under an implied
background principle of affirmative conduct favoring
conservation of protected species. 133 Indeed, the legislative
131. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (2000).
132. J.B. Ruhl, Section 7(a)(1) of the "New" Endangered Species Act:
Rediscovering and Redefining the UntappedPower of FederalAgencies' Duty to
Conserve Species, 25 ENVTL. L. 1107, 1125-37 (1995) (discussing cases in
which section 7(a)(1) is used as a "shield," a "sword," and a "prod"). See Part
III of this Article for more on this point.
133. The most prominent example is found in the 1995 report of the
National Academy of Sciences' National Research Council (NRC) in which
NRC engaged in a top to bottom review of the role of science in ESA decision
making and concluded, among other things, that the precautionary principle
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history of the jeopardy consultation provisions suggests that
Congress believed the agencies should, or at least could, "give
the benefit of the doubt to the species" when information is not
conclusive. 134 In these and other decision-making settings
where incomplete or inconclusive information requires the
agency to make a close call, several courts have also endorsed
the idea of giving the benefit of the doubt to the species, 135 and
the NMFS has on occasion announced in listing and jeopardy
consultation decisions that it would provide that benefit of the
doubt to the species or, in the same spirit, would "err on the
side of the species." 36 It is clear, however, that the statute
imposes no such default rule, and the agencies have not
officially adopted one as formal policy. 137 Any student of
should be applied in ESA contexts so as to impose the burden of proving no
harm on the proponent of an action. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE

AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 132-34, 138 (Nat'l Academy Press 1995).
134. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 96-697, at 12 (1979), reprinted in 1979
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2557, 2576.
135. See Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1452, 1454 (9th Cir. 1988)
(finding that when the FWS concluded that there was "insufficient
information available to render a comprehensive biological opinion"
concerning oil and gas leases, it must "give the benefit of the doubt to the
species" (citations omitted)); Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, 958 F. Supp.
670, 677, 680 (D.D.C. 1997) (stating that despite the FWS's claim that there
was not "substantial information that the southern Rocky Mountain
population of the Canada lynx meets the definition of a 'species,"' the agency
must "give 'the benefit of the doubt to the species and list it (citations
omitted)).
136. See, e.g., 66 Fed. Reg. 29,502, 29,506-07 (May 31, 2001) (codified at 50
C.F.R. § 224.103 (2001)) (explaining in the Comments and Responses section
that the promulgation of regulations under the ESA governing the approach of
listed whales is in part to implement a precautionary approach principle); 56
Fed. Reg. 58,619, 58,621-23 (Nov. 20, 1991) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 224.101(a))
(concluding in the explanatory sections that the Snake River Sockeye Salmon
is a species under the ESA, notwithstanding uncertainty as to whether it is
genetically distinct from other populations, and deciding to list it as
endangered); PROTECTED RES. DIv., NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., SECTION
7 CONSULTATION BIOLOGICAL OPINION AND INCIDENTAL TAKE STATEMENT FOR

BERING SEA/ALEUTIAN ISLANDS GROUNDFISH FISHERIES 133 (Oct. 19, 2001)
(explaining that the agency conducted the consultation at all times giving the
"benefit of the doubt" to the species); ENDANGERED SPECIES DIV., NAT'L
MARINE FISHERIES SERV., SECTION 7 CONSULTATION BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON
ATLANTIC HIGHLY MIGRATORY SPECIES FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN 99 (June

14, 2001) (explaining that in selecting takes of turtles from specified activities,
the agency would "err on behalf of the species"); see also Oregon Natural Res.
Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1149 (D. Or. 1998) (quoting an NMFS
official's rationale for recommending listing of a population of salmon as being
to "err on the side of the conservation of the species").
137. Indeed, other than the instances referred to above, I have found no
instances in which either the FWS or the NMFS so much as uses the phrases
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administrative law knows that, in close call cases where some
record evidence exists to support a decision in either direction
and the statute imposes no default position, the courts
generally defer to the agency's choice. Saying that the FWS
and the NMFS may err on the side of the species in those
settings, however, does not mean that they must. Nor, more
importantly, does it directly impose any form of affirmative
precautionary principle on anyone else.
By contrast, the ESA contains a negative expression of
behavior, known as the "take prohibition," which ranks as one
of the most powerful and broadly applicable statements of the
precautionary principle on the books. 138 Section 9(a)(1) of the
139
ESA instructs that, except as provided elsewhere in the ESA,
"with respect to any endangered species of fish ... it is
unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States to ... (B) take any such species within the United States
or the territorial sea of the United States."' 40 Recognizing that
the provision has defined limits-it does not apply to plant
species 14 1 and does not apply automatically to threatened
species of fish and wildlife' 42-but where it applies it does so
sweepingly and with tremendous force. Persons subject to the
prohibition include all federal, state, and local governments
and all private organizations and individuals. 43 It applies
"precautionary principle," "benefit of the doubt," or "err on the side of the
species" in any official ESA decision document the way that has been
suggested the ESA should be implemented. In addition to traditional legal

research methods, in October 2002 I conducted searches for these word
combinations in both agencies' records using search engines on their web sites.
See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Search the Endangered Species ProgramSite,
http://endangered.fws.gov/search.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2003); Nat'l
Marine Fisheries
Service, NOAA
Fisheries-Search the Fisheries,
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/search.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2003). I found no
additional instances. While this may not represent a comprehensive set of
available records, one would expect that if the agencies have widely used these
phrases to represent general adoption of a precautionary principle as a matter
of ESA implementation policy, more instances would have appeared. This is
reinforced by the fact that one or more of the phrases did appear in numerous
other documents implementing or associated with other authorities the two
agencies administer.
138. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2000).
139. For discussion of the exceptions, see infra text accompanying notes
149-165.
140. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1).
141. Plants receive more limited protection. See id. § 1538(a)(2).
142. The listing agency may by rule extend some or all of the take
prohibition protections to threatened species. Id. § 1533(d).
143. All these entities fit the ESA's definition of "person." Id. § 1532(13).
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"within the United States," on public and private lands alike. 144
It also applies to acts that "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
145
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect" the protected species.
Within that list of prohibited activities, the FWS and the
NMFS have defined "harm" to include any modification of the
species's habitat-in this case not limited to designated critical
habitat-that results in actual death or injury to species
members, 46 an interpretation of the
statute that the United
47
States Supreme Court has upheld. 1
The take prohibition, thus, imposes a negative behavioral
directive that fulfills the precautionary principle element of
eco-pragmatism. Whereas the "no jeopardy" environmental
baseline draws a rigid line against extinction at the species
level, the take prohibition operates at the level of individual
species members. The underlying premise is that endangered
species can be protected from extinction through a presumption
against causing death or injury to any individuals. This
presumption is given effect through a behavioral mandate that
applies in principle regardless of the degree of evidence
available as to the effects of a particular instance of take of an
individual on the well-being of the species as a whole. In other
words, the ESA does not require proof of jeopardy to the species
as a whole in order to enforce the take prohibition with respect
to individuals. Thus, even if State's hospital and Developer's
subdivision do not jeopardize Bird as a species, State and
Developer still must follow the take prohibition with respect to
individual birds and their habitat. In the absence of such a
precautionary approach, the cumulative effects of many federal,
state, local, and private actions, each of which affects only an
increment of habitat or only a small number of species
members, could drive a species ever closer to jeopardy. The
take prohibition guards against that possibility, imposing on
everyone a duty to refrain from the risky behavior.
Indeed, the take prohibition is quite unusual in this
respect, very much unlike other regulatory proscriptions found
throughout environmental laws. Pollution control laws, for
144. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B).
145. Id. § 1532(19).
146. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2001) (FWS definition); Id. § 222.102 (NMFS
definition).
147. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S.
687, 708 (1995). For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes
157-158, 161-163.
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example, involve expansive regulatory programs in which
agencies issue countless emission standards, force regulated
entities to monitor and report a multitude of activities, and
administer comprehensive permitting and enforcement
efforts. 148 By contrast, the take prohibition, buried deep in the
ESA, is sleek. It rests largely on the simple expression of a
duty. The FWS and the NMFS do not implement that duty
through nationwide technology standards, or landowner
registration and reporting programs, or industry performance
standards. There is no gargantuan set of "take regulations."
Quite simply, people have a duty not to take endangered
species.
The take prohibition, however, is not an unbridled version
of the precautionary principle. True to the eco-pragmatism
model, the "except as provided" caveat in the take prohibition
opens the door to balancing through impact assessment. The
take prohibition thus is not part of the environmental baseline,
which is subject only to a feasibility exception; rather, it
operates in the true sense of a precautionary, but rebuttable,
presumption. Of course, the rebuttable quality of the
presumption introduces controversy and contention; on the
other hand, without this balancing force, the ESA would be so
rigid it would likely have toppled long ago.
3. Impact Assessment: Incidental Take Permitting
49
The "except as provided" clause of the take prohibition
15
0
refers to section 10 of the ESA, the "permits" provision.
In
particular, section 10(a)(1) establishes a procedure for the FWS
and the NMFS to approve "incidental take" of species protected
under the take prohibition. 151 This incidental take provision
works with the take prohibition in a way that closely maps the
reverse sliding scales, shifting burden of proof model I have
described above as the workhorse of eco-pragmatism in case52
specific settings.1
First, as the counterweight to the take prohibition's
precautionary presumption, section 10(a)(1) allows the agencies
148. I have in mind, for example, the Clean Air Act, the text of which is
almost ten times the length of the ESA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000).
149. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1).
150. Id. § 1539.
151. Id. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
152. See supra Figure 1: The Precautionary Principle and Cost-Benefit
Analysis in Case-Specific Decision Settings.
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to approve actions that will cause take incidental to an
otherwise lawful purpose if the applicant submits a Habitat
Conservation Plan (HCP)153 satisfying the agency that, among
other things, "the applicant will, to the maximum extent
practicable, minimize and mitigate the impacts of such
taking" 54 and "the taking will not appreciably reduce the
likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the
wild." 155 This set of standards allows the agency to condition
approvals of case-specific takes on a scale of practicability, yet
keeps the environmental baseline still ever present in the form
of the proviso that no such activity, however much the
the take,
practicability standard counsels in favor of allowing
56
may jeopardize the species's continued existence.
Second, the Supreme Court supplied the variable burden of
proof in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Oregon (Sweet Home), 157 in which, as previously
mentioned, the Court approved the administrative regulation
defining the harm component of the take prohibition. 158 The
harm definition extends the take prohibition from cases in
which the action causes direct death or injury (e.g., hunting,
shooting, and trapping), to cases in which an indirect causal
chain is present, i.e., loss of habitat leads in some way to actual
death or injury "by significantly impairing essential behavioral
159
patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering."
Theories of indirect take causation, however, can become quite
attenuated and speculative, in which case it would be
153. The requirements for an HCP are set forth at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1539(a)(2)(A). "Incidental take," although not the subject of a specific
statutory definition provision, is described elsewhere in the statute as a take
that is "incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise
lawful activity." Id. § 1539(a)(1)(B). The FWS and the NMFS have adopted
this meaning for purposes of the regulations implementing section 7. 50 C.F.R.
§ 402.02 (2001).
154. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).
155. Id. § 1539 (a)(2)(B)(iv).
156. Congress expressly intended that "[tihe Secretary ... base his
determination as to whether or not to grant the permit, in part, by using the
same standard as found in section 7(a)(2) of the Act,... that is, whether the
taking will appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of
the species in the wild." H.R. REP. No. 97-835, at 29 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2870.
157. 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
158. Id. at 708; see also supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing
Sweet Home).
159. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2001) (FWS definition); id. § 222.102 (NMFS
definition).
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unreasonable to enforce the take prohibition's rebuttable
presumption against the activity as rigorously as in more
obvious cases of direct take.
For example, assume that
Developer's plan to build a subdivision in County would locate
new homes in an area within several hundred yards of habitat
known to be occupied by members of the Bird species, but not
in such habitat or critical habitat. Opponents of the project
may argue that some of the residents of the new homes will
have cats as pets, some of those cat owners will allow their cats
to wander outdoors, some of those cats may venture into Bird's
habitat, and some of those cats may eat birds, and some of
those birds may be individuals of the Bird species. Anyone
could speculate such possibilities, and it would be unreasonable
to impose the burden on Developer of proving the postulated
160
scenario is not possible.
Thus, Sweet Home emphasized that the harm rule must
"be read to incorporate ordinary requirements of proximate
causation and foreseeability"1 6' and acknowledged "strong
arguments that activities that cause minimal or unforeseeable
harm will not violate the [ESA] as construed."'162 In her
concurrence, Justice O'Connor was more explicit, limiting the
scope of the harm rule to "significant habitat modification that
causes actual, as opposed to hypothetical or speculative, death
163
or injury to identifiable protected animals."
Since the Court established these evidentiary burdens, the
lower courts have steadfastly refused to enforce the take
prohibition based on attenuated indirect take theories, but
have enjoined case-specific instances of take when death or
injury was proven to be likely. 164 Similarly, courts have applied
the sliding scale, shifting burden of proof approach by
reviewing incidental take permits based on the degree to which

160. See Morrill v. Lujan, 802 F. Supp. 424, 424-29, 433-34 (S.D. Ala. 1992)
(rejecting the ESA claim for injunctive relief based on this set of allegations).
In settlement of another round of litigation, initiated following the denial of
the injunction request, the developer in Morrill nonetheless agreed to prohibit
house cats in the development. See William H. Satterfield et al., Who's Afraid
of the Big Bad Beach Mouse?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer 1993, at 13,

15.
161. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 696-97 n.9.
162. Id. at 699.
163. Id. at 708-09.
164. For a current and thorough survey of the post-Sweet Home cases, see
Alan M. Glen & Craig M. Douglas, Taking Species: Difficult Questions of
Proximity and Degree, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 65, 68-69, 132 (2001).
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the record substantiated the agency's finding that the applicant
had mitigated the impacts of take to the maximum extent
practicable, the burden being on65the person challenging the
permit to demonstrate otherwise.'
Judicial review of HCP incidental take permits has been,
for the most part, ad hoc and based on the available
administrative record. 166 More definitive benchmarks are
available and should be used to assist the agencies and the
courts in determining where on the sliding scale particular
cases rest. For example, in its recent study of incidental take
permits, the Defenders of Wildlife suggested that whether or
not the listing agency has promulgated a recovery plan for a
listed species under section 4(f) of the ESA 67 should dictate the
influence of the precautionary principle in incidental take
permit decisions.168 Listing decisions collect information about
a species decline, whereas recovery plans collect information
about how to improve a species's viability. 169 Thus, the
advocacy group explained,
Clearly, HCPs ... must move forward in the absence of updated
recovery plans. When recovery plans are not available, however,
conservation plans should incorporate the precautionary principle
strategy. That is, conservation plans should have better protection
for species, to make up for uncertainties stemming from inadequate
information and missing recovery plans.17

165. Compare Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
202 F. Supp. 2d 594, 622, 638, 646, 663 (W.D. Tex. 2002) (holding that the
finding was supported by the record), with Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 15 F. Supp.
2d 1274, 1281-84 (S.D. Ala. 1998) (holding that the finding was not supported
by the record).
166. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
167. Section 4(f) requires the listing agency to "develop and implement
plans (hereinafter in this subsection referred to as "recovery plans") for the
conservation and survival of endangered species and threatened species." 16
U.S.C. § 1533(f) (2000).
168. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, FRAYED SAFETY NETS:
PLANNING UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 54 (1998).

CONSERVATION

169. Recovery plans are required to include "site-specific management
actions" and "objective, measurable criteria" for the conservation of the
species. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1)(B)(i)-(ii).
170. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, supra note 168, at 54. By contrast, some
endangered species advocates suggest a framework in which the precautionary

principle is unyielding, that the burden of proof never shifts. For example, the
director of the Endangered Species Coalition suggests,
[W]e should not change the precautionary principle. This tenet of
conservation biology holds that even when we do not have all the
information, we should never take risks where an endangered species
is involved. In legal terms, this means that the burden of proof is on
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The corollary, of course, is that when a recovery plan and the
information it contains about the species is available, the
precautionary principle no longer should dominate decision
making and impact assessment can rise in influence.
The point is that there are different stages of knowledge
about endangered species, beginning with knowledge about its
decline (the listing stage) and advancing to knowledge about its
conservation (recovery plans) and, we hope, its return to
viability (recoyery and removal from the list).
An ecopragmatic approach would correspond decision making to this
time-line of knowledge. For example, in the case of Developer
seeking an incidental take permit to build out the subdivision
in Bird's habitat, the information that the FWS should demand
of Developer to overcome the precautionary take prohibition
should depend on the timing of the permit application relative
to this administrative knowledge time line. If Developer files
immediately after the FWS lists Bird, well before the FWS has
completed a recovery plan for Bird, Developer bears a heavy
burden in order to overcome the agency's bias in favor of
precaution. Once the recovery plan is prepared, however,
Developer and the FWS can use it as the reference point for
determining whether the permit criteria are satisfied, and thus
rely less on precautionary measures.
With some measure of reconstructing, therefore, the pieces
of the ESA begin to fit together in a way that closely tracks the
eco-pragmatism model. The listing function and the "no
jeopardy" mandate fulfill the objectives of the environmental
baseline, defining a tangible set of baseline conditions and a
clear behavioral directive. 17 1
The take prohibition is
remarkably consistent with the purposes of the precautionary
principle, establishing a normative direction in which human
behavior generally is to be exercised with respect to protected
species. 172 Lastly, the incidental take permitting procedure
introduces a mechanism for impact assessment that rebuts the
presumption against take when the permitting criteria are

those who promote development to show that they would not harm an
endangered species.
Brock Evans, Crisis Is the Real Agent of Progress, ENVTL. F., Mar.-Apr. 2002,
at 48. This is, of course, not the standard the incidental take permit program
employs.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 108-30.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 138-48.
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satisfied in case-specific settings. 173 The ESA thus provides a
real-world representation of the generalized model I developed
above, as illustrated in the following model.
Figure 2: The Take Prohibition and Incidental
Permitting In Case-Specific ESA Decision Settings

Burden of proof shifts

Take

Incidental take permitpracticability standard

Influence of EiSA
decision-making

principle

Take prohibitionprecaution against take

Degree ofcertainty that (a) the proposed action does not threaten the ESA's "no
jeopardy" environmental baseline and (b) the effects of the proposed action and
mitigation measures are known

Of course, I am not suggesting that Congress had this
model in mind when it enacted the ESA, or that Bruce Babbitt
had a copy of this graph taped to his wall as he embarked on
administrative reform of the ESA. I am suggesting, however,
that it is an interesting and useful way to think about the ESA,
about what it is and what it could be. Nothing about this
model requires that we change anything about the three
programs involved, except the way in which we think about
how they fit together. Indeed, as reflected in the numerous
citations to judicial opinions and administrative materials I
have supplied along the way, for the most part the courts and
the agencies have begun practicing this model. 174 The question
that remains, therefore, is whether we will let them continue to
do so, or even to strengthen its eco-pragmatic qualities. For
that we turn to the last two pillars of eco-pragmatismempiricism and adaptive management.

173. See supra text accompanying notes 149-70.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 108-70.
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B. MEDIUM OF IMPLEMENTATION
The ESA, particularly when framed in the reverse sliding
scales, shifting burden of proof model, forces many questions
with few easy answers. What is jeopardy for a species? Is it a
function of population size, population dispersal, habitat
condition, or all of these? Will a particular action take
individuals of a species? Which ones, and when? Is the
mitigation proposed for an incidental take authorization
adequate? Is it the maximum practicable? These are the right
questions to ask-they are eco-pragmatic questions-but we
must also find the right medium within which to process them.
For eco-pragmatism that means a medium steeped in
empiricism and adaptive management. Here again, the ESA
comes out looking remarkably eco-pragmatic.
1. Empiricism: The Best Available Evidence Standard
As an intersection between science and law, the reliability
of decision making under the ESA necessarily depends on the
quantity and quality of scientific information available to and
used by the decision makers. The eco-pragmatic model of the
ESA described above could hardly operate on less than
sufficient and reliable scientific data. Accordingly, the ESA
incorporates several information requirements and standards
in the three programs that provide the statute its ecopragmatic structural foundation.
For example, the listing and critical habitat programs that
define the environmental baseline conditions specify the
decision criteria the agencies must use and impose a quality
standard for information, known as the "best available
evidence" standard, that the agencies must follow in evaluating
those criteria. 75 Thus, when deciding whether to list a species,
the FWS and the NMFS must consider factors such as loss of
habitat 176 using "the best scientific and commercial data

175. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2000) ("[Tlhe Secretary shall make
determinations ... solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial
data available. .. ."). See generally Laurence Michael Bogert, That's My Story
and I'm Stickin' to It: Is the "Best Available" Science Any Available Science
Under the Endangered Species Act?, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 85, 88, 118-40 (1994);
Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act: Why
Better Science Isn't Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1051-54,
1074-87 (1997).
176. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(A).
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available."1 77 Similarly, the "no jeopardy" behavioral directive
relies on a consultation procedure between the action agency
and agency with jurisdiction over the species in question, in
which the agencies exchange detailed information regarding
the impacts of the proposed action on the species, 178 all of which
79
is subject to the "best available evidence" quality standard.
Although the statute leaves this "best evidence" standard
of data quality undefined, its "obvious purpose ...is to ensure
that the ESA not be implemented haphazardly, on the basis of
speculation or surmise." 180 It is, in other words, a check on
both the hasty application of the precautionary principle and
the uninformed use of impact assessment. Accordingly, the
courts have interpreted it to impose several practical guidelines
on the agencies.' 8 ' The agencies are prohibited from
manipulating their decisions "by unreasonably relying on
certain sources to the exclusion of others," 8 2 from disregarding
"scientifically superior evidence,"18 3 and from declaring
84
scientific data unreliable due to "[rielatively minor flaws."
The agencies must use the best data available, not the best
data possible; 8 5 therefore, they may not insist on conclusive
data in order to make a decision. 186 The agencies are not
required to conduct independent research to improve the pool of
available data, however. 187 Thus, they "must rely on even
inconclusive or uncertain information if that is the best
available at the time of the listing decision." 188 Through all of
this, the agencies must manage and consider the data in a
transparent administrative process.18 9

177.
178.

Id. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
Id. § 1536(a)(2).

179. See id. § 1536(c); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(8) (2001).
180. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 176 (1997).
181. See Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 2002 WL
1733618, at *8-*9 (D.D.C. July 29, 2002) (summarizing the existing body of
case law); see generally Doremus, supra note 175, at 1051-56, 1074-87 (1997).
182. Southwest Ctr., 2002 WL 1733618, at *8.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. (citing Building Indus. Ass'n of Superior Cal. v. Norton, 247 F.3d
1241, 1246-47 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
186. Id. at 9.
187. Id. (citing Southwest Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. Babbitt, 215 F.3d
58, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
188. Id.
189. Doremus, supra note 175, at 1084-87.
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Similarly, in 1994 the FWS and the NMFS issued a joint
policy providing guidelines for how the agencies will ensure
that their ESA decisions incorporate this evidentiary
standard. 190 The policy directs the agencies to follow six
guidelines in ESA implementation decisions vital to the ecopragmatic approach, such as species listing, jeopardy
consultations, and incidental take authorizations: (1) require
that all biologists evaluate all scientific and other information
that will be used to make the decision; 191 (2) "[g]ather and
impartially evaluate biological, ecological, and other
information that disputes official positions, decisions, and
192
actions proposed or taken by the [FWS or the NMFS]";
(3) ensure that biologists "document their evaluation of
information that supports or does not support a position being
proposed" by the agency; 193 (4) use primary and original sources
of information as the basis for consultation decisions or
recommendations; 194 (5) adhere to the time frames or
"schedules" established by the ESA; 195 and (6) "conduct
management-level review of documents developed by [the
agency] to verify and assure19 6 the quality of the science used to
establish official positions."
In other words, information is valued in the ESA, not
merely in quantity but also in quality. The agencies must
respect the value of empirical experience and take all available
reliable information into account, but must move forward with
decision making even in the face of limited information. This
approach thus puts into play both the precautionary principle
and impact assessment: Decision makers cannot undermine the
precautionary principle by pointing to a lack of data, but nor
can they undermine impact assessment by selectively ignoring
available data. As implemented, therefore, the best available
evidence standard advances the purpose of empiricism in ecopragmatism, doing so with explicit recognition of the roles of
97
the precautionary principle and impact assessment. 1
190.

59 Fed. Reg. 34,271 (July 1, 1994).

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

197.

Proposed legislation in Congress, the Sound Science for Endangered

Species Act Planning Act of 2002, would make the empiricism purpose of the
best available science standard even more explicit, mandating that the FWS
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Yet two questions linger with respect to the best available
evidence standard, one directed to the "best" factor in the
equation and the other to the "available" factor. The first is
whether adding "best" to the standard has made any
appreciable difference in the outcome of ESA decisions. Most
other environmental laws do not contain the same or any
similar condition on the quality of the evidence that an agency
may consider. The default rules for those statutes are provided
in the judicial review provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), under which a court could find that an
agency's reliance on sloppy, filtered, or haphazard science is
arbitrary and capricious. 198 Why not just leave it at that for the
ESA? What does "best" add?
I confess it is difficult to pinpoint the incremental effect of
the best available evidence standard. 99 On the one hand, the
courts behave as if the best available evidence standard means
something,20 0 yet it is not clear that any of the decisions finding
the standard satisfied or violated would have turned out
differently under the conventional APA test. Turning to a
different forum, I venture to guess that we would witness lively
debate in Congress, and a packed house of lobbyists
representing all variety of interests, were a serious movement
afoot to add the best available evidence standard to all the
other environmental laws. Legislative posturing, however,
does not equate with legal significance. Overall, the practical
effect of the best available evidence standard may simply be to
reinforce the empirical theme of ESA decision making, and
thus to support implementing the statute through ecopragmatism. Even if that is all that it does, then, I find ecopragmatic value added by the "best" factor in the ESA's best
available evidence standard.
The second question raises a more problematic concern for
and the NMFS ensure that their species listing decisions "give greater weight
to any scientific or commercial study or other information that is empirical or
has been field-tested or peer-reviewed." H.R. 4840, 107th Cong. § 2 (2d Sess.
2002). As noted previously, this already is the policy of the agencies. See
supra note 190.
198. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2001).
199. This is a question that, to my knowledge, has received little attention
in commentary or judicial treatments of the best available evidence standard,
and which deserves more attention than time and space provide here. I thank
Rob Fischman for raising the question and exploring it with me to the extent
discussed in the text.
200. See supra notes 180-89 and accompanying text.
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eco-pragmatic implementation: Does the "available" factor in
the standard unduly limit its eco-pragmatic force? It does,
after all, scale back the standard from "best possible" to "best
available," thus relieving the agency of any duty to conduct
independent empirical research and requiring that the agency
make a decision even in the face of incomplete or inconclusive
data. All agencies-indeed, all decision makers-face this
struggle to know when to cut off the quest for new data and
make a decision based on the data at hand, however. It is a
struggle that screams out for pragmatic approaches, such as
the reverse sliding scale, shifting burden of proof model
developed above.
Adding "available" after "best" simply
acknowledges that, in the general case, the FWS and the
NMFS have to place a limit on how far they take the "best"
factor.
There will be cases, however, for which the "available"
limit, if rigidly applied, could handcuff the agencies from
making eco-pragmatic decisions.
The final pillar of ecopragmatism, adaptive management, responds to that concern.
Adaptive management necessarily requires an emphasis on
empiricism; however, empiricism does not lead inevitably to
adaptive management.
Indeed, rigid application of the
"available" factor could suppress adaptive management. The
incorporation of adaptive management into the ESA
implementation program thus broadens the program's use of
empiricism to respond to the need, in certain contexts,
continuously to feed new information into the decision-making
process.
2. Adaptive Management: Habitat Conservation Plans
The eco-pragmatic model of the ESA I have defined above
is, like any eco-pragmatic program, dynamic in its decisionmaking process. Information about imperiled species is not
static. Our understanding of what contributes to their
imperilment and to their recovery is in flux. Our conception of
where any one case rests on the sliding scales graph will
change over time. Decisions and decision-making processes
under the ESA must change over time as well. To be carried
out eco-pragmatically, in other words, the ESA must rely on
adaptive management styles of governance and use adaptive
instruments of regulation and policy. This, the last pillar of
eco-pragmatism, is Bruce Babbitt's true legacy to the ESA.
Babbitt took charge of the ESA at a time when its
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reputation had reached a low point in the Republicancontrolled Congress, where the statute had become the
whipping boy for property rights advocates. 201 At the same
time, the statute had amassed a reputation with environmental
protection interests for under performing in its species
conservation mission.20 2 How, then, could Babbitt enhance the
species conservation performance of the ESA without running
more afoul of property rights resentment? With Congress
poised to gut the statute, he had to think fast about a way out
of that dilemma.
His stroke of brilliance was to forge a two-part agenda that
sought to resolve
both issues through innovative
interpretations of ESA authorities. 20 3 One side of the agenda
focused on enhancing species conservation through greater
emphasis of ecosystem-level management of habitat and other
resources vital to the sustainability of imperiled species. 2°4 The
other side of the agenda focused on providing a greater voice
and more fairness to landowners on whose property the
imperiled species are found. 20 5 This double-barreled agenda
took many forms and led to numerous regulatory
206
innovations.
The most prominent example of the impact this approach
201. For a more thorough account of the factors that set the stage for the
actions discussed in this portion of the text, see Leshy, supra note 22,
at 208-12.

202. See, e.g., DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, supra note 168, at 3
("[C]onservationists assert that the ESA is not adequately enforced ....
[C]onservationists

ask whether it makes sense to focus some effort on

conserving species before their numbers drop so low and their habitat shrinks
so much that listing becomes necessary.").
203. Once again, an insider's account provides a thoughtful perspective on
the strategic approach the Babbitt administration took. See Leshy, supra note
22, at 212-14.

204. See, e.g., Interagency Cooperative Policy for the Ecosystem Approach
to the Endangered Species Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,273 (July 1, 1994); George
Frampton, Ecosystem Management in the Clinton Administration, 7 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POLY F. 39, 40 (1996) (authored by a DOI official). For a survey
of the policies the Babbitt administration collected under the ecosystem
management theme, see J.B. Ruhl, Who Needs Congress? An Agenda for
Administrative Reform of the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
367, 374-87 (1998).
205. See Ruhl, supra note 204, at 388-400 (surveying the policies serving
economic interests).

206. For a summary of the current status of the various regulatory
innovations attributable to the Babbitt-era FWS, see EUGENE H. BUCK ET AL.,
CONG.

RES.

SERV.,

ISSUE BRIEF NO.

DIFFICULT CHOICES 9-12 (Jan. 7, 2003).
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has had on the ESA is the Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP)
program, which another eco-pragmatist has described as "a
sweeping new approach to protecting endangered species."2 °7
As described above, landowners prepare HCPs as part of the
application for incidental take permits under section 10(a)(1) of
the ESA. 20 8 Although Congress added the so-called "HCP
permit" program to the ESA in 1982, by 1990 only a handful of
HCP permits had been requested and issued.20 9 The program
was simply not on the radar screen of landowners or the
agency. Babbitt saw it, however, as the perfect medium for
resolving the ever increasing instances of collision between the
ESA take prohibition and urban growth. 2 10
Beginning
primarily in Austin, Texas, and in southern California, the
2 11
number of HCP permits began to grow in the early 1990s.
With experience, the agency added structure and standards to
the program. 21 2 Landowners increasingly participated in HCPs
as a means of resolving ESA issues with lasting certainty,
while the agency increasingly promoted the program as a
means of managing species conservation across ecosystem-level
scales.213

To fuse these two objectives, Babbitt made adaptive

207. See Farber, supra note 118, at 38.
208. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1) (2000).
209. By 1992, for example, the FWS had issued only 12 HCP permits,
whereas it had issued 225 by October 1, 1997. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE,
supra note 168, at vi. For background on these developments and the HCP
program in general, see Eric Fisher, Habitat ConservationPlanningUnder the
EndangeredSpecies Act: No Surprises & the Quest for Certainty, 67 U. COLO.
L. REV. 371, 381-87 (1996); Shi-Ling Hsu, The Potential and the Pitfalls of
Habitat ConservationPlanning Under the Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10,592 (1999); Albert C. Lin, Participants'Experiences with Habitat
ConservationPlans and Suggestions for Streamliningthe Process, 23 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 369, 374-409 (1996); Ruhl, supra note 3; Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The
Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings & Incentives, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 305, 335-47 (1997); Robert D. Thornton, Habitat Conservation Plans:
Frayed Safety Nets or Creative Partnerships,16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 94

(2001).
210. See Leshy, supra note 22, at 213-14.
211. See Thornton, supra note 209, at 95 (discussing the southern
California HCP experience).
212. For example, the FWS has published a lengthy handbook describing
the steps required to obtain an HCP permit. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV. &
NAT'L
MARINE
FISHERIES
SERV.,
ENDANGERED
SPECIES
HABITAT
CONSERVATION PLANNING HANDBOOK (1996) [hereinafter HCP HANDBOOK].

213. See Thornton, supra note 209, at 95 (stating that the use of HCPs
"skyrocketed" after the announcement of the Babbitt reforms).
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management a core feature of HCP permits. 214 Near the end of
his tenure, by the time the HCP permit program had gotten
fully on its feet, the FWS announced it would henceforth
administer permits under the ESA, where gaps in information
can run high, using adaptive management as a means to
"examine alternative strategies for meeting measurable
biological goals and objectives through research and/or
monitoring, and then, if necessary, to adjust future
conservation management actions according to what is
learned." 21 5 The FWS thus portrayed adaptive management as
an important practical tool that "can assist the Services and the
applicant in developing an adequate operating conservation
program and improving its effectiveness." 21 6 The integration of
adaptive management in the HCP process, which is by no
means required or even signaled in the statute, is what sealed
HCP as "a system of negotiation rather than one of unilateral
federal imposition on landowners." 217 Adaptive management, as
the FWS uses it, also leads to continuing relations between the
parties after issuance of the incidental take permit, which
214.

See HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 212, at 3-24.

215. Notice of Availability of a Draft Addendum to the Final Handbook for
Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 64
Fed. Reg. 11,485, 11,486-87 (Mar. 9, 1999). HCPs thus are acknowledged to be
working hypotheses of how species will respond to changes in habitat size,
location, configuration, and quality. To truly integrate adaptive management
into an HCP, the plan must include a monitoring program to evaluate the
performance of mitigation measures and a system that automatically triggers
alternative conservation actions in the event that performance fails to meet
conservation goals. Gregory A. Thomas, Where Property Rights and
Biodiversity Converge Part III: IncorporatingAdaptive Management and the
PrecautionaryPrinciple into HCP Design, 18 ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE
32, 34-35 (2001); George F. Wilhere, Adaptive Management in Habitat
ConservationPlans, 16 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 20, 26 (2002).
216. See Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for
Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65
Fed. Reg. 35,242, 35,252 (June 1, 2000). For an in-depth discussion of the
integration of adaptive management into the HCP program during Babbitt's
tenure, see Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species
Act, and the Institutional Challenges of "New Age" EnvironmentalProtection,
41 WAsHBURN L.J. 50, 68-74 (2001).
217. Farber, supra note 118, at 43. Other commentators have stressed the
negotiation-based character of the HCP program. See Hsu, supra note 209, at
10,594-600 (describing the HCP negotiation process between agency and
permittee, and concluding that HCPs may provide environmental benefits
when "valuable habitat and low-quality development land is exchanged for
valuable development land and low-quality habitat"); Ruhl, supra note 3, at
391-96 (describing the HCP mitigation negotiation process); Wilhere, supra
note 215, at 25.
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serves the agencies' goal of fostering long-term collaborative
"conservation partnerships" with landowners. 2 18 Negotiation
and collaboration both thrive in the context of empiricism and
working in the reverse sliding scale, shifting burden of proof
model. 2 19 Not surprisingly, therefore, HCP permits proliferated
under Babbitt's tenure and continue to do so in the current
administration, coming in all sizes and flavors and adapting to
local circumstances and the record of available evidence to
meet the national policy goal of species conservation. 22 0
218. As one FWS official has explained,
We will continue to incorporate contingency planning within all types
of HCPs. In the future, HCPs will have improved structure in their
adaptive management strategies.... Increased structure in adaptive
management strategies will require increased vigilance on the part of
the permittees and the Service during implementation of. long-term
plans; this reflects the nature of the conservation partnership created
by HCPs.
Marj Nelson, The Changing Face of HCPs, ENDANGERED SPECIES BULL.,
July/Aug. 2000, at 4, 7; see also Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem
Governance, supra note 86, at 190. To be sure, adaptive management, to be
implemented, does not require establishing collaborative relations between
regulators and other interested parties. Most adaptive management
advocates, however, portray it as most effective when it is housed in a
collaborative framework.
See John Schelhas et al., Introduction to
BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY:
BALANCING INTERESTS THROUGH ADAPTIVE
COLLABORATIVE MANAGEMENT at xix, xxv (Louise E. Buck et al. eds., 2001).
219. One commentator recognizes the continuing, but declining, role of the
precautionary principle in this model, suggesting that where information
critical to the HCP design is scarce or uncertain,, application of the
precautionary principle counsels that the HCP should "be shorter in duration,
cover a smaller area, avoid irreversible impacts, require that mitigation
measures be accomplished before take is allowed, include contingencies, and
have adequate monitoring."
Thomas, supra note 215, at 36. Thus, as
information becomes more robust, the permit term can lengthen, the area
covered can enlarge, and so on.
220. As of December 12, 2002, the FWS had approved 414 HCPs ranging in
scope from a few acres to over 1 million acres and covering a total of 30 million
acres and 200 listed species. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Endangered
Species Habitat Conservation Planning, http://endangered.fws.gov/hcp/index.
html (last visited Feb. 14, 2003); cf. U.S. FISH & WILDIFE SERV., HABITAT
CONSERVATION PLANS AND THE INCIDENTAL TAKE PERMITTING PROCESS 1
(Nov. 2001) (stating that as of September 2001, over 360 HCPs had been
approved). For a running count, see U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., General
Statistics for Endangered Species, http://ecos.fws.gov/servlet/TessStatReport
(last visited Feb. 2, 2003). For an excellent statistical summary of the 208
HCP permits that the FWS had issued nationally by August 1997, including
acreage statistics, see PETER KAREIVA ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR ECOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS & AM. INST. OF BIOLOGICAL SCIS., USING SCIENCE
IN HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS 2-4, 14-18 (1999), http://www.nceas.ucsb.
edu/nceas-web/projects/97KAREI2/hcp-1999-01-14.pdf (last visited Feb. 2,
2003). HCP permits cover areas that vary widely in terms of size, with some
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There was not universal support for this shift toward ecopragmatic implementation of the HCP program. There are,
unquestionably, practical concerns about the rigor with which
adaptive management will be used, to which I respond that
adaptive management is, unquestionably, still a work in
progress in the HCP program. 22 1 Resistance to HCPs spread

covering a few acres while others cover in excess of 1.6 million acres. Id. at 14.
For a history of some of the early regional HCP efforts, see TIMOTHY BEATLEY,
HABITAT

CONSERVATION PLANNING:

ENDANGERED SPECIES

AND URBAN

GROWTH 23-39 (1994).
221. Skepticism in this sense falls into two categories. The first questions
the ability of agencies to fulfill the purposes of adaptive management in the
face of political pressures from resourcist interests. For example, Holly
Doremus argues that adaptive management, because of its inherent flexibility,
may in practice be subject to politically motivated abuse in the individualized
negotiation framework of HCPs, as well as to being diminished in effectiveness
by the parallel objective of providing fairness to landowners, which often is
translated into the provision of long-term certainty in the permitting context.
See Doremus, supra note 216, at 71-74. True enough, adaptive management,
to be effective, does require institutions that ensure a rigorous framework and
implementation policy, meaning that successful adaptive management
requires attention to institutional concerns as well to the fabric of adaptive
management itself. This does not, however, distinguish adaptive management
from any other resource management decision-making approach, and it cannot
reasonably be expected that the institutions necessary for adaptive
management to flourish will be in place before adaptive management can be
tested. The institutional question is, in other words, adaptive in its own right.
The second category of skepticism focuses on the interplay between the
adaptive management policy and another policy the Babbitt administration
introduced to the HCP process, the so-called "No Surprises" provision. This
policy relieves the HCP permittee of any additional conservation obligations
beyond those specified in the HCP with regard to unforeseen circumstances
that arise after the HCP is issued. See Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances
("No Suprises") Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859 (Feb. 23, 1998) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 17). The policy has been described as an essential component of the
HCP program, necessary to make HCPs attractive to landowners. See Fred P.
Bosselman, The Statutory and Constitutional Mandate for a No Surprises
Policy, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707, 717-19 (1997). Other commentators, however,
point out that the "No Surprises" policy may constrain the use of adaptive
management, as it cuts off revision of prior agreements about the HCP's
conservation measures. See Doremus, supra note 216, at 72-73. In fact, the
"No Surprises" policy simply defines who is responsible for those measures,
and a robust adaptive management provision in an HCP negates the
argument that matters contemplated as the subject of adaptive management
were unforeseen for purposes of the "No Surprises" policy. Hence, with
deliberate attention by the permitting agency to the contours and interplay of
the adaptive management and "No Surprises" provisions of an HCP, the two
seem perfectly capable of meeting their respective objectives. See Jan S. Pauw
& James R. Johnston, Habitat Planning under the ESA on Commercial
Forestlands, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 102, 104-05 (2001) (discussing the
relationship between "No Surprises" and other policies).
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well beyond those who focus on the practical effects, however.
Simply put, advocates of the strongly moralistic vision of the
ESA have a hard time handling the notion that endangered
species can be killed, which is the premise of an HCP, and that
the forum for doing so is a negotiation between landowners and
a government agency. 222 The reality, however, is that the
longer ESA implementation clung to the moralistic vision, the
more perverse its effect on the goal of species protection. Lack
of flexibility in the incidental take program, coupled with the
threat of liability for take of species on private property, sent
all the wrong messages to landowners about endangered
species. Consider that when land development is a major
contributing cause of a species's endangerment, which is true of
most listed species, those landowners who developed in the
species's habitat before the listing, and who thus caused the
problem, escape regulation, whereas the poor souls who
maintained the species's habitat shoulder all the land use
constraints. 223 That is simply unfair. Under such a regime, no
economically rational landowner would: (1) conserve habitat of
a species known to be a candidate for listing in the near future;
(2) promote the introduction of habitat for species already
listed; or (3) do anything to call attention to the presence of a
listed species or its habitat. 224 Yet these are the behaviors the
ESA should seek to promote.
Recognizing this irony, Babbitt not only stuck to the HCP
program reforms in the face of intense opposition from
preservationists, 225 he broadened them to address all of these
policy perversions, with adaptive management as the central
implementation approach. As his administration wound down,
it adopted the Candidate Conservation Agreement mechanism
222. Thus, I recognized that my choice of title for a previous article
describing the "nuts and bolts" of the HCP program-How to Kill Endangered
Species, Legally-was likely to "leave most readers somewhere between
uncomfortable and incensed." Ruhl, supra note 3, at 349. The point is that we
have to be able to talk about the ESA for what it is-a law that has to be
implemented in case-specific settings, many of which involve some loss of an
endangered species or its habitat.
223. See J.B. Ruhl, The Endangered Species Act and Private Property:A
Matter of Timing and Location, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 37, 42-43 (1998)
(discussing the "unfairness" of this aspect of the ESA).
224. Id. at 44-48.
225. See, e.g., John Kostyack, Surprise!, ENVTL. F., Mar./Apr. 1998, at 19
(presenting extensive criticism of the Babbitt administration's HCP reforms
from the perspective of a National Wildlife Federation attorney); Thornton,
supra note 209, at 95-96 (describing other organizations' criticisms).
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to provide incentives to landowners to conserve habitat of
candidate species, 226 and developed the Safe Harbors
mechanism to provide incentives to promote the introduction of
habitats of species already listed. 227
Neither of these
mechanisms would have been conceived under the moralistic
vision of the ESA, because both rely on landowners being able
to take protected species. Yet, with these tools now in place,
and if rigorous adaptive management is allowed to guide them,
it is fair to say that the agency will be able to point to
numerous instances in which landowner and agency combine
efforts to yield something for both (and the species).228 In the
end, eco-pragmatism did more to advance the underlying
normative concern of the ESA than the moralistic vision would
have accomplished, and did so even while enhancing fairness to
landowners.
III. WHAT ABOUT RECOVERY?
I have painted a rosy picture of the ESA with ecopragmatic paint. Indeed, some may say it is a whitewash, as I
have barely mentioned the central goal of the ESA-that of
recovering species-embodied in the recovery plan program of
section 4(f) of the ESA. Where does that appear in the model?
The answer is, it doesn't. Notwithstanding that the stated
purpose of the ESA is to "provide a program for the
conservation of... endangered
species and threatened
species," 229 that the statute defines conserve to mean "the use
of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any
endangered species or threatened species to the point at which
the measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer
necessary," 230 and that section 4(f) provides that the FWS and
the NMFS "shall develop and implement" recovery plans for
226. Announcement

of

Final

Policy

for

Candidate

Conservation

Agreements with Assurances, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,726 (June 17, 1999); see also
Francesca Ortiz, Candidate Conservation Agreements as a Devolutionary
Response to Extinction, 33 GA. L. REV. 413, 462-82 (1999) (explaining the CCA

mechanism and comparing it to the former policy).
227. Announcement of Final Safe Harbor Policy, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,717 (June
17, 1999).

228.

For a discussion of how the realigned incentives have produced

positive endangered species outcomes, see Michael J. Bean, Overcoming
Unintended Consequences of Endangered Species Regulation, 38 IDAHO L.
REV. 409, 414-20 (2002).
229. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000).
230. Id. § 1532(3).
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listed species, 23 1 recovery efforts have been resigned to an
adjunct status. There is latent potential there, 232 but it is yet
unfulfilled and thus not a part of my ESA eco-pragmatic model.
As I explained earlier, the ESA, as implemented, uses a
negative "no jeopardy" baseline rather than an affirmative
"promote recovery" baseline. 233 That could have been different
for federal agencies, however, as section 7(a)(1) could
reasonably be construed as imposing an affirmative recovery
duty on federal agencies.
Judicial and administrative
reluctance to fill out the duty so broadly has taken that
possibility off the table. 234 Similarly, the courts have construed
the "shall implement" language of section 4(f) to impose only a
235
discretionary recovery plan implementation duty.
With sections 7(a)(1) and 4(f) off the table, the recovery
goal has no remaining teeth. The take prohibition in section 9
requires only that actors avoid take, not that anyone help the
species along the road to recovery. Indeed, the standard for
incidental take permits-that the applicant's project "will not
appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery
of the species in the wild"236-expressly contemplates that
permits may impose some marginal cost to recovery of the
species. 237 Hence, either by explicit statutory containment or
by administrative or judicial construction, recovery has been
eviscerated as a meaningful component of the ESA's
implementation model. It is, instead, a satellite program that
occupies much of the agencies' aspirations but little of their
231. Id. § 1533(f).
232. For a thorough description of the origins, current framework, and
future potential of the ESA recovery program, see Federico Cheever, Recovery
Planning, the Courts and the Endangered Species Act, 16 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T 106 (2001).
233. See supra Part II.A.1.
234. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (stating that courts have

allowed agencies to determine the extent of their duty).
235.. See Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535, 547 (11th Cir. 1996)
(commenting that "recovery plans are for guidance purposes only"); Defenders

of Wildlife v. Lujan, 792 F. Supp. 834, 835 (D.D.C. 1992) (stating that a
recovery plan is not an "action document"); see also Cheever, supra note 232,
at 108-09 (discussing the inability to enforce recovery planning provisions).
236. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv).

237. For a thorough discussion of this feature of the HCP criteria and the
manner in which it suppresses a "promote recovery" baseline behavior under
the ESA, see Robert J. Fischman & Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A Lesson for
Conservationfrom Pollution Control Law: Cooperative Federalismfor Recovery
Under the Endangered Species Act, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 45, 70-72, 144-46
(2002).
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time and money.23 8
What should the eco-pragmatist make of this? Does this
expose a flaw or weakness in eco-pragmatism generally, or in
the eco-pragmatic model of the ESA specifically? Or does it
simply reveal eco-pragmatism at work, doing its job of shaping
outcomes that balance conflicting goals? Full recovery of the
complete list of endangered species, after all, may not even be
feasible.
These are by no means inconsequential questions. Under
its "no jeopardy" baseline, the ESA has in fact kept many
species from extinction, 239 but has recovered very few. 240 There
is, in other words, very little recovery "bounce" to be gained
from the "no jeopardy" approach.
Preservationists, I expect, will point to this performance
reality as evidence that, in the end, eco-pragmatism will
invariably cave in to economic interests, or at least be
subjugated to them, and that eco-pragmatists may have
insufficient political will or power to carry the day. In fact,
however, it shows that the decisions about how to define
baseline conditions and baseline behavior are fundamentally
normative in character. In the case of endangered species, our
society is not, at this time, ready to commit to a "promote
238. As has been observed, "[blecause recovery of listed species ... is the
goal of the ESA, it is somewhat surprising that recovery planning has
maintained such a low profile among the Act's programs." Fischman & HallRivera, supra note 237, at 57.
239. Only seven species have been removed from the list of endangered and
threatened species because of post-listing extinction. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ENDANGERED SPECIES PROGRAM: INFORMATION
ON How FUNDS ARE ALLOCATED AND WHAT ACTIVITIES ARE EMPHASIZED, No.

GAO-02-581, at 6 (June 2002), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02581.pdf
[hereinafter GAO REPORT]. Almost half of the listed species are considered
stabilized or improving in population size. BUCK, supra note 206, at 5. For
descriptions of the post-listing removals due to recovery and extinction, see
ROBERT J. NOECKER, CONG. RES. SERV., REPORT FOR CONGRESS No. 98-32:
ENDANGERED SPECIES LIST REVISIONS:
A SUMMARY OF DELISTING
AND
DOWNLISTING,
http://www.cnie.org/nle/crsreports/biodiversity/biodv-

18.cfm (Jan. 5, 1998). One recent study suggests rather strongly that the
success of the ESA in achieving recovery of species is correlated closely, and
not surprisingly, with appropriations. Julie K. Miller et al., The Endangered
Species Act: Dollarsand Sense?, 52 BIOSCIENCE 163, 167 (2002).
240. As of June 2002, twenty-nine years after the ESA was enacted, over
1200 animal and plant species found in the United States have been listed as
endangered or threatened. In that period, only thirteen species have been
removed from the list because of having achieved recovery from their
imperiled status. GAO REPORT, supra note 239, at 6.
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recovery" baseline, but has endorsed a "no jeopardy" baseline
with considerable vigor and over the objections of many
resourcists. From that starting point, as I have demonstrated
above, the Babbitt administration's implementation of the ESA
strongly supports
using eco-pragmatism as a model for the
24 1
ESA's future.
Whether we should move the starting point from "no
jeopardy" to "promote recovery" is a different question. It is
one the answer to which could benefit from an open, honest,
focused dialogue, a forum that seems never to materialize in
the legislative, administrative, and judicial battles between
preservationists and resourcists. Indeed, it is perhaps the
fundamental question for the formulation of endangered
species policy. Either approach, however, leaves the door wide
open to eco-pragmatic implementation solutions, and society's
choice of one over the other as the baseline reveals no weak
underside to eco-pragmatism.
CONCLUSION
It is frequently argued that the ESA is a failure because so
few listed species have been recovered and more species keep
getting listed. 242 If that is an indictment of the ESA, it is an
indictment of far more about humanity as well. The better
question is, how many species once listed have nonetheless
crossed the ESA's baseline and vanished forever? From that
perspective, as noted above, the ESA is a success. Moreover,
that number has been kept low notwithstanding that a great
deal of economic activity and land development has proceeded
under the ESA's watchful tenure. We have, in other words,
held the "no jeopardy" baseline and found pragmatic solutions
in case-specific decision settings when the baseline is not at
risk.
The preservationists and the resourcists, not surprisingly,
241. Although not framed explicitly as an eco-pragmatic undertaking,
several commentators have proposed further evolution of the ESA toward
goals that fulfill the eco-pragmatic agenda through greater emphasis on the

use of specialized rules under section 4(d) of the statute, which allows the
FWS and the NMFS to craft particularized conservation and regulation
measures for threatened species. See Fischman & Hall-Rivera, supra note

237, at 133-60. This and other continued explorations of the eco-pragmatic
potential of the ESA may prove fruitful.
242. See Michelle Desiderio, ESA Reform: Facing Hard Truths, in
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at
533, 549-50.
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each have their alternative stories. Preservationists liken the
ESA to plugging holes in the dike, and the dike is going to
burst any moment under pressure from the "biodiversity
crisis."243 What appears to be working is simply holding off the
catastrophe. All will soon be lost, irreversibly. On the other
side, resourcists tell stories of outlandish applications of the
ESA-the hospital that had to move to save a fly; the kindly old
lady who lost her nest egg to save a bird-as if to say that the
entire undertaking is a cost-benefit failure. 244 Financial ruin is
around the corner.
There is some truth in both stories, but the ESA, now
almost thirty years old, has evolved with them. Secretary
Babbitt saw opportunities to address both concerns and seized
on them in ways that were remarkably consistent with the ecopragmatist model. 245 My advice is that, short of building a new
eco-pragmatic statute from scratch (something I would be
happy to think about some other time), we work on finding
more such opportunities under the ESA. Indeed, that they
have been there, and more may yet remain to be tapped, is no
accident. I have suggested that, with some creative thinking,
the ESA closely maps what I have described as the essential
model of eco-pragmatic regulatory programs.
The point not to be lost, however, is that eco-pragmatism is
a package of elements, all of which must be in place for any to
work. The three-part instrumental framework of environmental
baseline (the ESA's jeopardy prohibition), precautionary
principle (the ESA's take prohibition), and impact assessment
(the ESA's incidental take procedure) must fit together,
working seamlessly as a system of decision-making
instruments.
Leaving any one part out means we have
something other than eco-pragmatism in place. Moreover, the
three parts cannot work to their fullest potential as a system in
the absence of the two implementation elements-empiricism
(the ESA's best available evidence standard) and adaptive
246
management (as in the ESA's HCP program).
Clearly, all the eco-pragmatism pieces are there for the
ESA; Bruce Babbitt simply put them into play as a coherent
243. See William J. Snape III, The Endangered Species Act: Anatomy of an
Environmental Scapegoat, in ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at 519, 519-26.
244. See Desiderio, supra note 242, at 533-49.
245. See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
246. See supra Parts I.B.1-2.
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whole. The preservationists and resourcists may prefer the old
set of rules, but I believe, and hope I can convince others to
believe, that we ought to take advantage of what Babbitt put in
place, to run with that underlying structure for a while and let
it play out. In short, when we think ESA, to think ecopragmatically.

